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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plans to
introduce a single currency by 2010 in its six
member states, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This paper focuses
on selected macroeconomic and institutional
issues and key policy choices which are likely
to arise during the process of monetary
integration. The main findings are that (i) a
supranational GCC monetary institution is
required to conduct a single monetary and
exchange rate policy geared to economic,
monetary and financial conditions in the
monetary union as a whole; (ii) GCC member
states have already achieved a remarkable
degree of monetary convergence, but fiscal
convergence remains a challenge and needs to
be supported by an appropriate fiscal policy
framework; and (iii) there is currently a high
degree of structural convergence, although this
is expected to diminish in view of the process
of diversification in GCC economies, which
calls for adequate policy responses.5
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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plans to
introduce a single currency by 2010 in its six
member states, namely Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). This paper focuses on
selected macroeconomic and institutional
issues and key policy choices which are likely
to arise in the GCC’s process of monetary
integration. It does not however assess the
potential benefits and costs of a GCC monetary
union, given that the political decision has been
taken to introduce a single currency, and nor
does it analyse options for monetary and
exchange rate policy in the GCC after a single
currency has been launched.
The main findings of the paper are that (i) a
supranational GCC monetary institution is
required to conduct a single monetary and
exchange rate policy geared to economic,
monetary and financial conditions in the
monetary union as a whole; (ii) GCC member
states have already achieved a remarkable
degree of monetary convergence, but fiscal
convergence remains a challenge and needs to
be supported by an appropriate fiscal policy
framework; and (iii) there is currently a high
degree of structural convergence, although this
is expected to diminish in view of the process
of diversification in GCC economies, which
calls for adequate policy responses.
The objective of monetary union in the GCC is
embedded in a broader economic integration
process, for which an ambitious, but consistent
agenda has been set. Following the realisation
of a free trade area and a customs union, the
completion of a common market is scheduled
for 2007, prior to the introduction of a single
currency in 2010. A deepening of the so far
relatively low degree of economic integration
in the GCC would be helpful in order to reap
the potential benefits of a monetary union,
supporting the case for a comprehensive and
timely implementation of the planned stages
of integration. Furthermore, GCC institutions
assisting the economic integration process,
which so far has followed a mainly
intergovernmental approach, might need to be
strengthened in view of the stages of
integration ahead.
A GCC monetary union will necessarily
require a single and indivisible monetary and
exchange rate policy. Given this principle of
indivisibility, monetary union is more than just
a particularly tight exchange rate arrangement,
and the mere coordination of national monetary
policies is not sufficient to sustain a single
currency. A single monetary and exchange
rate policy that is geared to the economic,
monetary and financial conditions in the single
monetary area as a whole can only be ensured if
it is conducted by a supranational monetary
institution. In particular, decision-making on
monetary and exchange rate policy has to
be centralised, while there are different
options with regard to the centralisation
or decentralisation of the analysis,
implementation and communication of a single
monetary and exchange rate policy.
The analysis of monetary and fiscal
convergence in the GCC reveals a remarkable
degree of monetary convergence, with
generally low inflation rates in all member
states and short-term interest rates co-moving
in a narrow range. This is due to the GCC
currencies’ long-standing alignment with a
common external anchor, the US dollar, which
has led to a very high degree of intra-GCC
exchange rate stability that is all the more
noteworthy as it has prevailed in an
environment of liberalised capital accounts.
Fiscal convergence is less marked than
monetary convergence and seems to constitute
an important challenge for the GCC. As far as
can be discerned from available data, the
budget balance-to-GDP ratios as well as public
debt levels vary significantly between member
states.
While the current state of structural
convergence of GCC member states does not
seem to constitute an impediment to a
functioning monetary union, the high degree of6
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structural homogeneity cannot simply be
extrapolated into the future. Given the
dominant role of oil and gas in the GCC
economies, their economic structures,
dynamics and trade patterns are broadly
similar, thus reducing the likeliness of
asymmetric shocks or the need to resort to
nominal exchange rate adjustments. However,
both the pace and direction of economic
diversification will probably differ in the
future between GCC member states, and will
thus reduce the structural similarities between
their economies. This process is likely to be
reinforced by the very different time horizons
over which the oil and gas reserves of GCC
member states are expected to be exhausted,
raising the possibility that a GCC monetary
union might in the future comprise both major
oil and gas producing countries and non-oil/gas
producing countries. This stresses the
importance of strengthening adjustment
mechanisms other than the nominal exchange
rate (such as factor mobility and price
flexibility) in order to cushion asymmetric
shocks, the likelihood of which may increase in
the wake of ongoing diversification.
It would be helpful to monitor an appropriate
set of monetary and fiscal convergence criteria
in a framework of multilateral surveillance
in order to entrench and further promote
economic convergence. Key policy choices
refer to the purpose, economic content and
design of such criteria. The criteria could prove
a useful information tool for assessing policies,
and may serve as an anchor for expectations,
although their role as a disciplining device for
policies may remain limited due to the
prevailing consensus in the GCC that they
should not be selection criteria determining
membership of the monetary union. It would be
sufficient for monetary criteria to function as
entry criteria, while fiscal criteria could play a
useful role both as entry criteria and as
permanent criteria, thereby serving as the
foundation for a set of permanent fiscal rules.
Ensuring sustainable fiscal convergence on
the basis of sound public finances both in
the run-up to monetary union and after its
establishment is warranted, so as to avoid a
situation in which undisciplined national fiscal
policies undermine a stability-oriented
monetary framework and lead to undesirable
spillover effects between member states. While
several options for appropriate fiscal criteria
are conceivable, it is crucial that they take into
account the specifics of fiscal policy in oil
economies. For a meaningful monitoring and
assessment of convergence criteria, and later
on for the conduct of an area-wide monetary
and exchange rate policy, the quality,
availability and comparability of statistical
data in GCC member states needs to be
ensured.
Finally, a strong and informed political
commitment to the objective of a GCC single
currency and a basic consensus on the
orientation of a single monetary and exchange
rate policy are key prerequisites for
establishing a sustainable monetary union in
2010, taking into account the fact that
monetary union inevitably entails the transfer
of monetary sovereignty from the national to
the supranational level.7
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The European Union (EU) can look back on a
history of more than 50 years of regional
economic and monetary integration. Integration
is far advanced, has been much discussed and
analysed, and has often become a point of
reference for other regions in the world, even
though it is only one of many experiences
regarding regional economic integration.1 The
debate about regional monetary integration and
attempts to form regional currency blocs has
particularly intensified since the successful
introduction of the euro, which seems to have had a
“demonstration effect” for other regions of the
world.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
comprising six member states on the Arab
peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) has
recently made more definite plans for a regional
monetary union, with the ultimate objective of
introducing a single currency in GCC member
states by 2010. Plans for monetary integration in
the GCC date back to the GCC’s Unified
Economic Agreement, which was ratified in
1982, one year after the GCC was founded.
However, concrete steps to approach this
objective have only been taken over the last six
years. In December 2000 the Supreme Council
of the GCC (Heads of State) mandated the
Committee of Monetary Agencies and Central
Bank Governors and the Financial and Economic
Cooperation Committee (Ministers of Finance)
to draw up a working plan and a timetable to
establish a single currency. In spring 2001 the
GCC governors and finance ministers decided to
establish a high-level technical working group in
order to study the requirements for a monetary
union. Initial results were presented at the GCC
Supreme Council meeting in Muscat in
December 2001, where Heads of State agreed on
the following stages and timetable to establish a
monetary union2:
– By the end of 2002, all national currencies
of GCC countries shall be pegged to the US
dollar.
– By the end of 2005, the Committee for
Financial and Economic Cooperation
(Ministers of Finance) and the Committee
of Monetary Agencies and Central Bank
Governors shall agree on economic
convergence criteria, methods to calculate
them, the required levels of these criteria,
and the manner in which to fulfil them.3
– Between 2005 and 2010, GCC countries
shall strive to fulfil the criteria.
– In January 2010, a single currency shall be
introduced.
The GCC’s planned monetary union is
interesting for a number of reasons. It seems to
be the most advanced initiative among various
attempts to achieve monetary integration in
many regions of the world, given the timetable
and state of preparations. Moreover, the degree
of economic convergence, in particular
monetary convergence, that has already been
achieved is high compared to other regions. If
realised, the GCC monetary union would be the
second most important supranational monetary
union in the world in terms of GDP and
population, after the euro area. Furthermore, it
is worth noting that this integration initiative is
taking place in a region, the Middle East, which
has up till now been characterised by a very
low degree of economic integration and
failed attempts to foster regional economic
interaction in an effective fashion, and whose
1 See ECB (2004).
2 The Muscat summit also concluded a new Economic
Agreement replacing the 1982 agreement and forming the
legal basis for a monetary union. The new Economic
Agreement, Article 4, stipulates: “For the purpose of
achieving a monetary and economic union between Member
States, including currency unification, Member States shall
undertake, according to a specified timetable, to achieve the
requirements of this union. These include the achievement of a
high level of harmonization between Member States in all
economic policies, especially fiscal and monetary policies,
banking legislation, setting criteria to approximate rates of
economic performance related to fiscal and monetary
stability, such as rates of budgetary deficit, indebtedness, and
price levels.”
3 The criteria are not intended to be selection criteria. Rather, it
is intended that all GCC countries shall introduce a single
currency simultaneously.8
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economic performance has attracted
considerable attention recently.4 Finally, the
GCC monetary union project has so far not
been widely covered in the economic
literature.5
Over the last few years the ECB has been in
contact with monetary agencies and central
banks in the region and with the GCC
Secretariat General to discuss – as with other
regional groupings – potential lessons from
monetary integration in the EU to the extent
that these are relevant to the region. This
Occasional Paper is based on an ECB staff
study on several aspects of the GCC’s
monetary integration process that was
conducted in this context. While the paper has a
clear focus on monetary integration in the
GCC, some of the aspects covered, relating for
example to convergence criteria and the
establishment of a supranational monetary
institution, are of broader interest for regional
monetary integration processes in general and
may be of relevance for other regions in the
world that are currently considering monetary
integration.
The paper is structured as follows: Chapters
2-4 review the characteristics of the GCC
member states’ economies; take stock of the
economic and institutional integration
achieved so far in the GCC; and analyse the
economic convergence of GCC member states.
Two key issues in the GCC’s monetary
integration process are discussed in the
following chapters, namely policy choices with
regard to convergence criteria (Chapter 5), and
the establishment of a supranational GCC
monetary institution (Chapter 6). Chapter 7
concludes with some final remarks.
4 The low degree of economic integration is reflected in intra-
regional trade, which accounts only for 8% of the total trade
of Middle Eastern and Northern African countries. The
economic performance of Arab countries compared to other
emerging market economies over recent decades has been
highlighted, for example, by the UNDP Arab Human
Development Report (2002).
5 So far, most publications have originated in the IMF. See for
example IMF (2003).9
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2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GCC MEMBER
STATES’ ECONOMIES
The six GCC member states, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, envisage completing the
process of economic integration by entering
into a monetary union. This project is based on
a shared economic background, as well as on a
common language and history. Arabic is the
official language across the entire Peninsula.
Oil and gas remain the region’s most important
products, even though some countries have
started to diversify their economies, focusing
in particular on banking, trade and tourism. All
economies are important employers of foreign
labour, due to a shortage of human capital in the
region.
This chapter reviews the key features of the six
economies and the main economic challenges
that lie ahead and that have a potential bearing
on monetary integration. Section 2.1 looks at
the GCC as a whole, putting it into perspective
with other economic areas in the global
economy. Section 2.2 focuses on the internal
structure of the GCC from the perspective of
major similarities and differences between the
member states. Finally, Section 2.3 is
dedicated to the major challenges facing the
GCC countries, namely diversification,
privatisation and labour market reform.
The main conclusions of the chapter are as
follows: firstly, the six GCC member states are
overall largely similar in terms of economic
structures and face common challenges;
secondly, most of their economies are largely
based on oil and gas, and are rather open
towards the rest of the world; thirdly, while
exports of oil and gas mainly go to Asia, a
considerable proportion of imports stem from
the EU; fourthly, in general, financial markets
in the region have not developed to a large
extent, as regulation and the strong focus on oil
and gas have led investors, also from within the
GCC, to prefer investment outside the region;
and fifthly, all the economies need to diversify
away from oil and gas, to decrease the size of
the government sector and to step up education
efforts and labour market reform. At the heart
of these challenges lies the need to generate
sufficiently high growth in the private non-oil
sector to promote employment opportunities
for the young and rapidly growing population.
Notwithstanding these broad similarities, there
are also some considerable differences. Oil and
gas endowment differs greatly between
countries, and reserves will soon be exhausted
in some countries, and in the distant future in
others. Financial markets are developed in a
few member states, but less so in others.
Pressure on the labour market is less acutely
felt in some countries, and diversification
efforts have not been equally successful
everywhere. The effects of these differences
will have to be taken into consideration when
envisaging monetary union.
2.1 THE GCC IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
The GCC economy as a whole comprises 35
million inhabitants and produces an aggregate
GDP of about €376 billion (2004 figures). It is
therefore comparable in population to Canada,
with which it also shares the distinction of
being one of the least densely populated areas
in the world. Total GDP is equivalent to
roughly half the Canadian or half the
aggregated Benelux output. The oil and gas
sector contributes more than one-third of GDP
in the GCC. Other contributing sectors, albeit
much smaller, are construction, tourism and
banking. Given the arid climate, agriculture is
of negligible importance. Developments in
nominal GDP and export values are closely
related to energy prices, in accordance with the
strong focus on oil and gas in the economy.
2.1.1 OIL AND GAS
The global importance of the GCC member
states stems from the fact that the countries
jointly account for 42% of global oil reserves,
and 23% of global natural gas reserves (see
Chart 1).10
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The GCC’s strategic position in international
energy markets will even increase over the next
few decades, as it currently produces relatively
little oil and gas per year in relation to the size
of its currently proven reserves. At present
output levels, which amount to 22% of global
oil and 6.5% of global gas production, the
GCC’s reserves are being depleted two to three
times more slowly than those of other regions
of the world.6 This suggests that at current
production levels, the GCC will be among only
a few remaining suppliers of fossil fuels in
2050.
2.1.2 WEALTH
In per capita terms, GCC energy reserves are
the highest globally, and comfortably exceed
the ratios of the next countries on the list. Per
capita oil reserves are more than five times
higher than in Venezuela, over 30 times higher
than in Russia, and over 150 times higher than
in the United States (US). Per capita gas
reserves in the GCC are moreover more than
four times as high as in the country with the
next highest ratio, Iran. Adding oil and gas
reserves as energy equivalents yields an
average of over 26,500 barrels of oil for each
GCC national (see Chart 2), equivalent to a
value of about €880,000 at year-end prices
(2003).
Income from the export of fossil fuels makes
the GCC the wealthiest region in the Middle
East and comparable to some of the newly
industrialised economies. Average income
per capita in nominal terms amounts to
some €11,000 per year, which puts the region
almost on a par with South Korea, a high-
income country by World Bank definitions. A
significant part of this income, about €4,000
6 Given that depletion projections depend on various factors
that are difficult to predict, such as the future state of
technology and prices, they should be regarded as highly
tentative.
Chart 1 Geographical distribution of global oil and gas reserves
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Chart 2 Per capita oil and gas reserves in
barrels equivalent
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2004; CIA
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per capita, is directly generated from oil and
gas revenues. The income distribution is more
uneven than in most other high-income
countries. This gap is most marked between
nationals and non-nationals, because nationals
receive higher wages than non-nationals. GCC
citizens hold large financial assets outside the
GCC financial system.7
2.1.3 TRADE
With regard to international trade, the GCC is a
rather open economy, with the average of
exports and imports reaching 48% of GDP. The
trade balance has displayed a surplus of 20% of
GDP on average over the last five years. While
exporting mainly oil and gas, the GCC imports
a high proportion of consumer and capital
goods as a result of the arid climate conditions
and the low share of manufacturing.
Roughly one-third of imports come from the
EU and more than a third from Asia, while only
9% come from the US (see Chart 3). Exports
are more concentrated and the main export
markets for GCC oil are in Asia. Over 65% of
total GCC exports are oil and oil products, and
more than half of total exports are destined
for Asia, principally to Japan, South Korea,
Singapore and China. The EU and US account
for 11% and 12% of exports respectively.
Trade between GCC members is fairly low,
accounting for just 5% of exports and 6%
of imports. This is explained mainly by the
similar factor endowment of the countries;
however, trade barriers, which are to be
eliminated as part of the integration process,
may also have contributed to this low figure
(see Chapter 3).
2.2 SIMILARITIES AMONG AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN GCC ECONOMIES
In terms of population and aggregate output,
Saudi Arabia is the largest of the six countries,
comprising about 24 million inhabitants (about
70% of the total GCC population) and
accounting for more than half of total GCC
GDP. The other five countries are considerably
smaller: the second largest country, the UAE,
is home to only 4.3 million people, or one-fifth
of the Saudi population. The UAE produces
roughly a fifth of total GCC GDP, less than half
that of Saudi Arabia (see Chart 4).8
While Saudi Arabia has the largest overall
weight in the GCC with regard to both
population and total GDP, its income per capita
7 Bourland (2001) estimates these assets at €870 billion, i.e.
over 230% of GDP. However, such estimates are subject to
great uncertainty.
8 Similarities and differences between GCC economies with
regard to economic developments (such as inflation and fiscal
policies) will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Chart 3 Export and import structures of the GCC
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
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is lower than in most of the other countries.
GDP per capita in Qatar is three times higher
than in Saudi Arabia and even exceeds the euro
area average by some 10% in nominal terms.
With a GDP per capita (in 2004) in nominal
terms of about €27,000 and €17,600
respectively, Qatar and the UAE are the
wealthiest countries in the GCC. While the
GDP per capita of Bahrain and Kuwait is lower,
they are also high-income countries. Oman
and Saudi Arabia (with a GDP per capita
above  €8,500) are upper middle-income
countries, and are still far wealthier than the
majority of the other Arab Middle Eastern
countries.  Converted to purchasing power
parity (PPP) standards, the differences between
GCC economies are less pronounced, although
Qatar’s GDP per capita remains more than
twice as high as Saudi Arabia’s, and almost
equals the euro area average (see Chart 5).
2.2.1 OIL AND GAS ENDOWMENT BY COUNTRY
Saudi Arabia accounts for more than half of all
GCC oil reserves, while resources in the other
GCC countries are considerably lower, with
Bahrain in particular having only very limited
natural resources. Although possessing
relatively little oil, Qatar is home to the third
largest natural gas reserves worldwide after
Russia and Iran, and receives a considerable
proportion of its income from gas. An examination
of reserves in per capita terms reveals large
differences in both oil and gas wealth per capita
between countries (see Chart 6). Oil reserves per
capita are relatively low in Oman and Bahrain,
and considerably higher in the other countries.
Similarly, gas reserves are relatively small in
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
While these differences between countries are
reflected in current production levels, resources
are especially tight in Oman and Bahrain where,
at current production levels, oil will run out
Chart 4 GCC basic economic indicators
Sources: IMF, ECB staff calculations.
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Chart 5 Income per capita in individual GCC
countries and GCC average
(GDP per capita in thousands, EUR, PPP)
Sources: IMF, ECB staff calculations.


























during the next two decades. By contrast, oil
reserves will last more than 100 years in Kuwait
and the UAE, which means that these countries
will be the only producers of oil in the GCC in
2100. Gas complements oil both in terms of
drilling and revenues. With almost 15% of the
world’s natural gas reserves, Qatar’s gas will not
be exhausted within the next 800 years at current
production levels. It is the only country that may
be producing gas far into the next century at
current output levels (see Chart 7). At the other
extreme, Bahrain’s reserves will run out soonest,
with an estimated lifetime of less than ten years.
The pressure to diversify differs between GCC
countries in line with the differences in energy
reserves. GCC governments have started to aim
at diversifying into other sectors, such as
tourism and services. Approaches have varied
widely, with the focus ranging from tourism to
banking and manufacturing (see Section 2.3.1).
Chart 6 Per capita oil and gas reserves
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2004. Oil reserves in barrels and gas reserves in cubic metres per capita.
Chart 7 Projected depletion of reserves
(oil reserves in billion barrels; gas reserves in trillion cubic metres)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2004.
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2.2.2 TRADE PATTERNS OF GCC MEMBER
STATES
While the GCC is overall rather open, the
openness of the individual economies varies
widely, ranging from 77% and 72% in Bahrain
and the UAE respectively, to 35% in Saudi
Arabia.9 For the GCC as a whole, the EU is the
most important provider of imports, with a
share of more than 30% of total imports. With
the exception of the UAE, all countries receive
the largest percentage of their extra-regional
imports from the EU. By contrast, the share
of imports from the US is less than 10% of
total GCC imports, or below one-sixth of the
total imports of each individual country (see
Table 1).
On the export side, most of the prominent
recipients of GCC exports are located in Asia,
with the exception of Saudi Arabia, which also
exports a large share to the US. Intra-regional
trade is fairly limited. Except for Oman, no
country exports more than 10% of its total
exports to other GCC members (see Table 2).
However, this picture changes somewhat if we
look at non-oil trade instead of total trade.
Kuwait and Qatar exhibit the highest share of
intra-GCC non-oil exports among member
states, exporting more than
half of their total non-oil exports (mostly
chemicals) to other GCC countries. Overall,
non-oil trade accounts for roughly one-third of
total trade within the region.10
On the import side, intra-regional trade is
most important for Bahrain and Oman, which
receive a considerable percentage of their
imports from the other Gulf states (Oman
imports machinery mainly from the UAE,
Saudi Total
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia UAE GCC
Exports-to-GDP ratio (%) 83.9 54.8 56.2 72.0 45.9 79.1 55.8
Destination of Exports 1)
Other GCC 5.9 1.5 10.6 4.8 4.8 5.1 4.9
EU 3.7 10.4 2.2 2.1 15.7 7.6 10.7
United States 3.6 11.9 3.3 1.7 20.7 2.2 11.7
Japan 1.3 22.0 16.2 46.0 15.4 26.1 20.3
Asia (excl. Japan) 8.1 49.2 59.4 36.6 32.1 31.4 34.2
Table 2 Destination of GCC exports (2003)
Sources: IMF DOTS and WEO.
1 ) As a % of total exports.
Saudi Total
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia UAE GCC
Imports-to-GDP ratio (%) 69.9 38.9 37.7 38.9 23.6 64.7 34.9
Source of Imports 1)
Other GCC 35.8 9.6 27.8 14.9 2.5 2.7 5.9
EU 24.4 34.1 21.7 35.5 31.1 33.6 31.9
United States 11.4 14.5 6.2 12.2 9.3 6.5 8.6
Japan 7.8 10.1 17.1 10.5 7.6 6.7 8.0
Asia (excl. Japan) 10.7 17.8 15.6 17.2 26.9 36.4 28.8
Table 1 Source of GCC imports (2003)
Sources: IMF DOTS and World Economic Outlook (WEO).
1) As a % of total imports.
9 Openess is defined here as the average of exports and imports
per GDP.
10 See Jadresic (2002).15
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while Bahrain imports predominantly oil and
fuel products from Saudi Arabia). The other
countries receive less than 15% from the other
GCC member states.
2.2.3 FINANCIAL MARKETS
The GCC financial systems are still relatively
small in most countries, but have developed
over recent years. They are largely bank-
based, although stock markets have recently
expanded. The banking sector is generally
well developed, profitable and efficient, in
particular compared with other Middle Eastern
and North African countries.11 Total GCC
banking assets amount to about 122% of GDP
(2003), with Bahrain, where bank assets exceed
800% of GDP, serving as a regional banking
hub.12 Due to interest rate ceilings in some
countries in the past, bank lending has focused
on the government sector rather than on the
local private sector. Although cross-border
lending within the GCC has been permitted for
several years, a genuine intra-regional
GCC banking market has not emerged (see
Chapter 3). Besides bureaucratic obstacles to
cross-border banking, expansion into other
GCC countries does not significantly improve
diversification for banks, as all six economies
are largely based on oil and gas. In addition,
one of the main driving forces for cross-border
expansion, namely trade in goods and services,
is at a low level, and has only recently become
more dynamic.
Given that many economic activities are closely
linked to oil price changes, they also have an
impact on banks’ balance sheets. Indeed, the
growth of GCC banks’ balance sheets is correlated
with oil price developments (see Chart 8). On the
liability side, it is worth noting that, overall,
GCC banks are well capitalised. Moreover,
financial institutions have been obliged to comply
with the Basel standards. In order to prepare for a
common financial area, regulation may require
harmonisation across countries and increased
cooperation between regulators across borders
(see Chapters 3 and 6).
Capital markets in the GCC have only recently
expanded and significantly differ in size
between member states. In September 2004, the
total stock market capitalisation of GCC
countries amounted to 113% of GDP, up from
42% in 2002, reflecting the stock market boom in
the wake of high oil prices. Stock market
capitalisation ranges from 51% of GDP in Oman
to 171% and 175% of GDP in Kuwait and Qatar,
respectively. Formal and sophisticated trading
infrastructures have only been established over
the last decade in many countries, and most of
the GCC stock exchanges still have considerable
potential for development. The Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency (SAMA) sponsors a
sophisticated computer-based stock trading
system, Tadawul.13 Qatar established the DSM
(Doha Securities Market) in 1997, while the
Bahrain and Oman exchanges have been in
operation for several years. Bank assets exceed
stock market capitalisation significantly in all
countries except Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Total
market capitalisation (measured by bank assets
plus stock market capitalisation to GDP) is
highest in Bahrain and Kuwait, while banking
and stock market capitalisation combined
are lowest in Saudi Arabia and in Oman (see
Table 3).
11 See Creane, Goyal, Mobarak and Sab (2004) and Berthélemy
and Bentahar (2004).
12 However, over 80% of bank assets in Bahrain are located in the
offshore sector, which may only conduct banking activities
with non-residents.
13 A capital market law that enforces complete disclosure by
listed companies was approved by Saudi Arabia’s Council of
Ministers on 15 June 2003.
Chart 8 Balance sheet growth of GCC
commercial banks and oil price
developments
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Unlike stock markets, secondary bond markets
have not developed at all. Bonds issued by
entities located inside the GCC equal less than
3% of GDP, around €13.3 billion. Most bonds
are listed abroad, particularly in Luxembourg.
Participation in the local capital markets is
largely restricted to the local population. As a
consequence, inward portfolio investment has
been subdued.
A low degree of inward investment is also
reflected in low rates of foreign direct
investment (FDI). The ratio of FDI stock to
GDP is, at around 11% (2003), considerably
lower than the world average of 23% or
the average for either developed countries
or developing countries (20% and 31%
respectively). In addition to the low figures in
absolute terms, FDI flows have been highly
volatile and closely linked to the oil price.
After recording net FDI outflows for two years
in 1999 and 2000, the GCC received positive
net FDI inflows of some €0.6 billion in 2001,
€1 billion in 2002 and €5.9 billion in 2003.
2.3 KEY ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
The GCC economy faces three major
challenges to economic development, namely
an increased need for diversification away
from oil and gas; privatisation in view of
the large size of the government sector; and
labour market reform and education. The key
issue behind these challenges is generating
sustainable high growth in the private non-
oil sector that can provide employment
opportunities for a young and rapidly growing
population.
2.3.1 DIVERSIFICATION
A main issue for the GCC economy is its strong
orientation towards oil and gas, which makes it
highly dependent on price developments in
global markets. While providing an important
source of income, the strong reliance on oil has
also proven to be a liability. Oil production has
lifted the level of economic development and
living standards enormously in past decades,
and the GCC countries went from being
essentially subsistence economies in the 1960s
to extremely wealthy countries by 1980.
However, following the decrease in oil prices
during the early to mid-1980s, income per capita
fell considerably and has stagnated or even
declined slightly since then (see Chart 9). The
virtual stagnation of per capita incomes over the
past 20 years is a major economic issue for the
region, and sets it apart from many other
emerging economies that by contrast witnessed
a steady and often even rapid increase in
incomes during the 1980s and 1990s.
Saudi
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia UAE GCC
Bank assets/GDP 866 329 50 98 62 121 122
Stock  market capitalisation/GDP 163 171 51 175 126 96 113
Table 3 Financial sector indicators
(percentages)
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and AMF.
Note: Bank assets in 2003, stock market capitalisation in September 2004.
Chart 9 Average GCC GDP per capita
(1995 = 100)
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)
database, ECB staff calculations.
Note: Data for a limited number of years are not included for
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The high oil dependency of the GCC economy
is reflected in the share of the oil and gas sector
in GDP, the share of oil revenues in
government revenues and the share of oil
exports in overall exports (see Table 4).
Calculations by the Arab Monetary Fund
(AMF) suggest that the oil and gas sectors
contribute more than one-third of total GCC
output. Taking into account the fact that over
80% of public services are financed by oil
revenues, the share of GDP that depends
directly and indirectly on oil and gas revenues
exceeds 50% of the total.
Oil income contributes around 80% to
government revenues, while oil exports
account for over two-thirds of total GCC
exports. Only 10% of GDP is generated by
Saudi
Oil share in … GCC Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia UAE
GDP 1) 36.0 25.7 45.9 43.1 56.8 34.9 28.1
Govt. revenue 2) 79.3 73.0 91.5 78.4 64.2 80.6 75.3
Exports 3) 67.0 66.7 83.8 64.5 34.5 85.5 38.8
Table 4 Oil dependency of the GCC and its member countries
Sources: AMF, national central banks, IMF, Institute of International Finance (IIF).
1) Oil and gas sector’s share of GDP as a % in 2001.
2) Oil revenue/total government revenue as a % (includes gas revenues for Bahrain) in 2000.
3) Oil and oil products’ share of total exports as a % in 2004.
manufacturing, and just 4% by agriculture (see
Chart 10).14
The high contribution from oil to GCC
countries’ overall exports and government
revenues implies that oil price volatility
translates into volatility in current account
balances and government budget balances.
Since there is no personal income tax or a
general consumption or value-added tax in any
of the countries, the financial base of the GCC
governments is particularly exposed to oil
price volatility (see Chart 11).
Chart 11 Influence of oil exports on current
account and government budget














current account balance (% of GDP) (left-hand scale)
general government balance (% of GDP) (left-hand scale)
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14 This reflects the adverse climatic conditions in all six
countries. Accordingly, the share of the urban population
exceeds 80% in each country, and is as high as 98% in Kuwait.
Chart 10 GDP shares by sector
(percentages)
Source: AMF.
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To reduce oil dependency, to enhance output
and efficiency in other sectors and to smooth
economic dynamics, diversification and
privatisation have been declared key economic
policy priorities. Moreover, governments have
realised that neither the public sector nor the oil
industry alone will provide sufficient job
opportunities for their young and growing
populations. The development of the private
non-oil sector is therefore seen as crucial to
ease labour market pressure.
The need for diversification is particularly
strong in Bahrain and Oman, whose oil reserves
are limited and are expected to run out during






























Chart 12 Diversification across GCC member states
Sources: ECB staff calculations on the basis of data from the AMF, the IMF, the World Tourism Organization and national
authorities.
Note: The graphs give shares of the maximum of all six countries. “Tourism” refers to tourist arrivals per capita of national
population; “Commodities” is income from oil and gas per GDP; “Finance” is stock market capitalisation plus bank loans per GDP;
and “Manufacturing” is the share of manufacturing in GDP.19
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has made efforts to diversify and to privatise,
including the opening up and liberalisation of
markets and the creation of an environment
more conducive to FDI inflows. In this context,
Saudi Arabia is currently applying
for World Trade Organization (WTO)
membership, while the other five GCC
countries are already members.
Using the percentage contribution of oil income
to GDP, government revenue and exports as
rough measures of oil dependence, the success
of diversification efforts varies between the
countries. Between 1986 and 1991, the export
share of oil even rose, before stagnating around a
level of 65% after 1995. While Bahrain and the
UAE in particular have been successful in
reducing their oil dependence, in the other four
countries it is considerably higher. The oil share
in exports has stagnated at levels around 80% of
total exports in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Chart 12 depicts the state of diversification in
the four most likely areas for generating
income in the GCC countries, namely
commodities, manufacturing, finance and
tourism.
These diversification results reveal the
following marked differences between
individual countries:
– Bahrain has established itself as a financial
hub for the Gulf region and for the Arab
world, particularly in Islamic banking.
Tourism, transport and related services are
other areas in which the country is gaining
ground.
– The UAE has similarly diversified into
tourism, manufacturing and transport,
making it the only other country apart from
Bahrain with a relatively low level of oil
dependency.
– Kuwait remains highly dependent on
commodities, while finance has developed
recently.
– Oman, despite having diversified into
manufacturing to a certain extent, is one of
the countries where the need for structural
change away from production of oil and gas
is most pressing.
– Saudi Arabia is not focused completely on
commodities either, but generates 10% of
GDP in the manufacturing sector and is
quite active in the construction sector. The
exploration of natural gas resources is seen
as another important source of
diversification, and an area for which Saudi
Arabia has great expectations.
– Qatar is even more focused on oil
exploration, and is also developing large
capacities for the extraction of natural gas.
A switch from oil to gas as the main source
of export revenues would not completely
solve the problems related to the Gulf
countries’ role as primary commodity
exporters. However, this move would still
reduce the effects of price volatility, as
natural gas prices tend to be less volatile
than spot prices on the oil market.
The differences in both endowment of oil and
gas and in diversification efforts may induce
considerable differences in the economic
structures across GCC countries. While today
all the GCC countries largely rely on energy
exports, this can be expected to change to a
varying degree over the coming decades, as
discussed above. This development may make
the GCC economy more prone to asymmetric
reactions to exogenous economic shocks (see
Chapter 4).
2.3.2 PRIVATISATION
Privatisation is seen as the key to
diversification and greater economic
efficiency. A major problem for GCC
economies is their large government sectors, in
combination with the high degree of
dependence of government budgets on oil and
gas. Oil companies are nationalised, ensuring
government control of this vital sector.
Government spending on large infrastructure20
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projects also strongly influences the non-oil
sector of the Gulf economies. As this type of
spending typically varies with fluctuations in
budget balances and thus oil revenues, the
volatility of oil prices also has a major impact
on the non-oil sector (see also Chapters 4 and
5). Public sector companies are predominant in
other key sectors such as telecommunications,
energy and water supply, health and air
transport. Moving away from this dependence
requires intense privatisation efforts.
Currently, government services contribute
25% to GCC GDP and are the main source of
employment for nationals. The result in most
cases is large administrations and a high share
of wage payments in government budgets.
While all governments have embarked on the
privatisation process, it is difficult to gauge the
success of these efforts. Large privatisation
projects, especially in public utilities, have
raised the private sector contribution to GDP
over the last decade. However, the distinction
between the public and private sectors is not
straightforward, as it is sometimes difficult to
attribute shareholder ownership clearly to the
two sectors.
The opening of capital markets is another
aspect of efficient privatisation that needs
further development. Foreign investment
regulations have been changed considerably to
permit foreigners to hold shares in GCC
companies (see Chapter 3). However,
restrictions on access to the stock exchanges
and on majority holdings in GCC companies in
several member states continue to prevent the
allocation of international capital to the GCC
market.
2.3.3 LABOUR MARKET REFORM AND
EDUCATION
High population growth has become an
increasing challenge for national governments,
as it has been accompanied by rising
unemployment, especially among the young.
The GCC area has been characterised by one of
the world’s highest rates of population growth
(3.2% per year over the past decade), resulting
in a very young population. In 2002, almost
40% of the GCC population were below 15
years of age.
Besides high birth rates among nationals,
immigration has contributed to population
growth in some member states. The economies
of the GCC rely to an extraordinarily high
extent on expatriate workers. An educational
mismatch of the local population has prevented
GCC nationals from working in most industries
that require higher education, especially
technical skills. Accordingly, high-skilled
labour is carried out to a considerable extent by
expatriates. Non-nationals (mostly from
South-East Asia or other Arab countries) also
provide a large part of the unskilled labour. As
a result, expatriates outnumber nationals in the
workforces of some GCC countries. The share
of nationals in the total population is only 65%,
while the share in the workforce is even lower,
as immigrant workers do not always bring their
families (see Table 5).
Given high population growth and young
populations, young GCC nationals find it
increasingly difficult to obtain employment.
While official unemployment figures do not
exist for all countries, external sources
estimate that unemployment in the GCC ranges
Saudi
GCC average Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia UAE
65.1 60.0 33.4 77.3 26.3 74.6 24.3
Table 5 Shares of nationals in total population
(percentages)
Source: ESCWA.
Note: Data refer to 2000.21
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from 3% to 17%.15 The Arab Human
Development Report 2002 indicates that the
population in the region will continue to grow
rapidly, exceeding 44 million by 2020, some
140% of the current population.16 The
populations in Saudi Arabia and Oman are
expected to grow by around 60% within two
decades (i.e. between 2000 and 2020). In
combination with low oil resources, the
pressure on the labour market is especially
strong in Oman. While Bahrain’s population
will also grow rapidly, the country seems
sufficiently diversified to cope with running
out of gas.
GCC governments have attempted to address
this challenge by initially reserving positions
in the public sector largely for nationals. Many
nationals are employed in the services sector, a
large part of which is public. Services employ
over three-quarters of the active population,
but only contribute 43% to GDP. More
recently, quotas for nationals and stricter work
permit requirements for the employment of
expatriates have increasingly been imposed in
the private sector as well.
This policy of regulation is complemented by
efforts to enhance the education and training of
nationals. While the level of education has
15 Figures from United Nations (2002). Estimated
unemployment of the working-age national population in UAE
is 2.6%, Bahrain 3.1%, Qatar 5.1%, Kuwait 7.1%, Saudi
Arabia 15.0%  and Oman 17.2%.
16 United Nations (2002). Forecasts for growth in the period
2000-2020 are: UAE 23%, Qatar 29%, Bahrain 30%, Kuwait
30%, Saudi Arabia 61%, and Oman 63%. This corresponds to
annual growth rates of between 1% and 2.5%.
Chart 13 Human Development Index and
education sub-index
Sources: World Bank, ECB staff calculations.
Chart 14 Human Development Index and
education sub-index in the GCC
Sources: World Bank, ECB staff calculations.
been raised considerably over recent years,
there is still room for improvement in tertiary
education. Educational standards in the GCC
countries lag somewhat behind the world
average. The overall Human Development
Index (HDI) for the GCC compares favourably
with the world average (see Chart 13). But
while income and life expectancy in the GCC
exceed the world average, the sub-index for
education compares unfavourably not only
with the high and middle-income countries, but
also with the world average. By contrast with
the GCC, the education sub-index exceeds the
overall HDI in both high-income and middle-
income countries. The Arab states as a whole
comprise the only country group in which the
education index lags behind the HDI. Indeed,
this index is fairly similar across GCC member
countries (see Chart 14), and lags behind the
HDI in every GCC country except Bahrain and
(just) Qatar. In terms of adult literacy, none of
the six countries matches the middle-income
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Education levels vary widely, and are most
advanced in Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, where
enrolment rates at all levels of education of
over three-quarters compare well with those
of middle-income countries. In the GCC as a
whole, enrolment rates are on average lower
than in the Arab world as a whole. Enrolment
rates in the range of 60% in Oman and
Saudi Arabia indicate possible challenges
regarding the development of labour market
qualifications in these countries. This
generates a potentially problematic mixture
with population growth.23
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3 INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN THE GCC
This chapter – after highlighting the relevance
of the broader integration process for monetary
union in the GCC – outlines the institutional
underpinnings on which the GCC’s economic
integration project is based. It sets out the basic
legal texts of the GCC and describes the main
decision-making and implementing bodies.
Furthermore, it summarises the development of
the GCC’s economic integration project since
its inception in 1981. The chapter also briefly
states the objectives of the process as set out in
the statutes and the principal economic
agreements. It then provides a summary
assessment of progress made towards these
objectives, using as a benchmark the so-called
four freedoms – the free movement of goods,
services, capital and natural persons.17
The key findings of this chapter are as follows.
The project of monetary union in the GCC is
not an isolated act of integration, but is
embedded in a comprehensive integration
project, aimed at the creation of a common
market that would remove all barriers to the
movement of goods, services, labour and
capital. While both the objectives and
timetable of economic integration in the GCC
are ambitious and seem sufficient to underpin a
sustainable monetary union, the effective
implementation of the agreed objectives will be
of paramount importance prior to the planned
introduction of a single currency in 2010. In
addition, with regard to areas such as capital
markets, some services sectors and possibly
labour mobility, the expected efficiency gains
of a common market (and monetary union) are
limited by the dominance of the public sector in
GCC member states, which tends to bypass the
allocation function of the market. The GCC has
developed a broad range of institutions to
support the economic integration process. The
institutional framework of the GCC has so far
relied heavily on an approach based on
comprehensive intergovernmental coordination
at the political and technical levels. While this
construction has its merits and appears to have
served its purpose well in the past, GCC
institutions might need to be strengthened in
the light of integration steps ahead.
3.1 RELEVANCE OF THE BROADER
INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE GCC FOR
MONETARY UNION
As in any monetary union, the economic
viability of the GCC’s project to introduce a
single currency crucially hinges on the degree
of economic integration among its members.
The expected economic benefits of adopting a
single currency are associated with, among
other factors, reduced uncertainty, lower
transaction costs and the facilitation of cross-
border trade and financial transactions. In
order to reap these benefits fully, it is desirable
to eliminate in the GCC, insofar as possible,
non-monetary obstacles to integration.
Moreover, a high degree of cross-border factor
mobility can also serve to mitigate the
economic impact of asymmetric shocks and can
thus contribute to the sustainability of the
monetary union.
The project of GCC monetary union therefore
needs to be embedded in a broader effort
towards comprehensive economic integration,
which should ultimately aim to eliminate all
barriers to the movement of goods, services,
labour and capital. A logical sequencing of
stages of integration is thereby warranted, with
monetary union ideally being established only
when economic integration has matured to an
extent that lends credibility to the monetary
integration project. The GCC’s schedule in
terms of economic integration – a fully fledged
free trade area to be established via a customs
union in 2003, then the completion of a
common market in 2007, to be followed by
monetary union in 2010 as outlined below – is
consistent with this approach. The timing of
this schedule is, however, ambitious. The
challenge in the coming years will be to
implement the envisaged stages of integration
17 In the European context, these four freedoms were laid down
as the hallmark of the establishment of the Single Market in
the Single European Act (signed in 1986).24
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effectively. This will require, judging from
the European experience, political commitment
at the highest level, strong administrative
capacities and enhanced multilateral
surveillance.
3.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
OF THE GCC
3.2.1 LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
The six Heads of State of Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
founded the GCC by signing the “Charter of the
Cooperation Council” in Abu Dhabi in May
1981. The Charter establishes the main bodies
of the GCC, namely the Supreme Council, the
Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General
and lays down their composition, their
functions and their mutual relations.18 In
November 1981 GCC leaders signed the
“Unified Economic Agreement”, which
replaced previous bilateral agreements and
stipulated in some detail the main objectives
and measures of economic cooperation. The
Unified Economic Agreement came into force
in January 1982 and remained the legal basis
for much of the GCC’s integration process until
it was replaced 20 years later by the new
“Economic Agreement between the States of
the Cooperation Council” concluded by the
GCC Summit in Muscat in 2001. In addition to
these founding documents, the Supreme
Council has over time adopted a number of
GCC laws and regulations.
3.2.2 GCC INSTITUTIONS
The institutional framework of the GCC today
comprises three main pillars, namely the
intergovernmental decision-making and
consultative bodies with the Supreme Council
and the Ministerial Council at its core, the
Secretariat General as the major supranational
institution, and a number of specialised
regional agencies.19
Intergovernmental bodies
The  Supreme Council is the GCC’s highest
authority and main decision-making body. It is
composed of the Heads of State of the member
states, and its presidency is rotated annually.
The Supreme Council’s main tasks are to
provide policy direction, review reports and
recommendations submitted by subsidiary
bodies and to appoint the Secretary General of
the GCC.  Resolutions are passed on the basis
of unanimity for substantive matters, and by
simple majority for procedural matters. The
Supreme Council meets twice a year (once
formally and once informally), with the option
of extraordinary sessions at the request of
individual member states.20
The  Ministerial Council is composed of
Foreign Ministers or other ministers as
delegated by member states. It proposes
policies and prepares recommendations,
studies and projects in all fields. Like the
Supreme Council, resolutions are passed on the
basis of unanimity for substantive matters and
by majority for procedural matters. The
Ministerial Council meets every three months,
with the option of extraordinary sessions at the
request of member states. At the ministerial
level, a number of specialised committees have
also been established, of which the most
important in respect of economic integration is
the Committee for Financial and Economic
Cooperation, which is composed of the
Ministers of Finance and Economics. These
18 The Rules of Procedure for the Supreme Council, the
Ministerial Council and the Commission for the Settlement of
Disputes were also approved in May 1981.
19 Among these institutions, only the Supreme Council (along
with its Dispute Settlement Commission), the Ministerial
Council and the Secretariat General were established by the
1981 GCC Charter. Since then, numerous intergovernmental
committees and sub-committees have been established at
various official and working levels; the Secretariat General
has been extended and assigned new responsibilities; and
common agencies have been established to provide technical
and research services to the region.
20 The Charter of the GCC also provides for a Commission for
the Settlement of Disputes, which is attached to the Supreme
Council. The Commission is formed on an ad hoc basis for
each case. The Commission looks into the case and submits its
(non-binding) recommendations to the Supreme Council.
However, this provision has not been invoked since the
founding of the GCC. In addition, in 1997 the Consultative
Commission for the Supreme Council was established to
provide advice on any subject referred to it by the Supreme
Council. It comprises 30 members, with seats equally
distributed among the six member countries.25
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ministerial committees are similar to the
Ministerial Council in their working
procedures, as they prepare studies and submit
recommendations to the Supreme Council
through the Ministerial Council. They in turn
mandate various sub-committees to conduct
studies, draft proposals and coordinate national
policies at a technical level.
As a rule, the various intergovernmental bodies
may pass binding and non-binding decisions
only at their level and in their field of
jurisdiction. While the Supreme Council’s
decisions are to be applied through decrees
issued at least at the level of the member
states’ councils of ministers, the ministerial
committees may approve common rules within
the executive jurisdiction of the respective
ministers. Central bank cooperation in the GCC
takes place within the Monetary Agencies and
Central Bank Governors’ Committee, which
meets twice a year and reports to the
Committee for Financial and Economic
Cooperation, and its sub-committees, which
include the Banking Supervision Committee,
the Payment Systems Committee, the
Monetary Union Committee and the Training
Committee.
The GCC Secretariat General
The Secretariat General is the GCC institution
with the most pronounced supranational
character (see Box for its functions and
interaction with the intergovernmental bodies).
In contrast to the above-mentioned bodies, the
Secretariat General does not consist of
representatives of the member states, as its
mandate, according to the GCC Charter, is to
work independently and for the common interest
of the members. It is located in Riyadh with a
staff of approximately 400, and is headed by the
Secretary General, who serves a three-year term,
renewable only once. The Secretary General
nominates the Assistant Secretaries General,
who are appointed by the Ministerial Council for
renewable three-year terms. The Secretariat
General is composed of six Directorates
(Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, Military
Affairs, Environmental and Human Resources,
Legal Affairs and Financial and Administrative
Affairs) and an Information Centre. The new
monetary union unit, which the Supreme
Council decided to establish at its 2002 session
in Doha, has also been attached to the Secretariat
General. This will increase the number of staff
working on monetary affairs at the Secretariat
General.
Box
FUNCTIONS OF THE GCC SECRETARIAT GENERAL AND ITS INTERACTION WITH
INTERGOVERNMENTAL BODIES
The Secretariat General is not only in charge of the administrative preparation and follow-up of
the meetings of the intergovernmental bodies, but also prepares studies and reports on issues
related to the cooperation objectives, follows up the member states’ implementation of GCC
resolutions and recommendations, and drafts resolutions and common legislation. Its
representatives participate in the consultations of the various specialised committees.
Moreover, the Secretariat General acts as the common representative of the GCC in some
international fora, such as the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in Paris.
There is also a GCC Permanent Mission to the European Commission in Brussels. A new task
was assigned to the Secretariat General in Article 27 of the 2001 Economic Agreement, namely
the settlement of disputes concerning the implementation of the Agreement and the ratified
decisions based on it, including claims raised by private parties. In such cases, the Secretariat
General will try to reach a harmonious solution between the parties, or will refer the matter to
the GCC Commercial Arbitration Center or a newly formed judicial body.26
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Specialised agencies
GCC member states have also set up a number
of specialised agencies, such as the
Standardization and Metrology Organization for
GCC Countries,21  the GCC Commercial
Arbitration Center,22  and  the Patent Office.23
While dealing with widely different substantive
matters, these agencies share similar governance
structures: each agency is headed by a board of
directors composed of representatives of the
member states, and has a permanent technical
staff. Through a number of Supreme Council
resolutions and implementing national
legislation, the decisions of these agencies,
namely arbitration rulings, patent grants and the
issuance of Gulf standards, have been accorded
directly binding status in all GCC member
states.
3.3 THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN THE GCC
3.3.1 OBJECTIVES AND HISTORIC EVOLUTION
OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS
The Charter of the GCC lays down the basic
objectives of the GCC as follows:
– to effect coordination, integration and
interconnection between member states in
all fields in order to achieve unity between
them;
– to deepen and strengthen relations, links
and areas of cooperation now prevailing
between their peoples in various fields;
– to formulate similar regulations in various
fields, including economic and financial
affairs, commerce, customs and
communications, education and culture,
social and health affairs, information and
tourism and legislative and administrative
affairs;
– to stimulate scientific and technological
progress in various fields;
– to establish scientific research;
– to establish joint ventures and encourage
cooperation by the private sector.
The interaction between the Secretariat General and the various intergovernmental bodies in
the process of GCC legislation can serve to illustrate the relationship between these two
major pillars of the GCC institutional framework. In some cases, the Supreme Council can
decide to harmonise national legislation in a specific field and then mandates the Secretariat
General to draft a new GCC law/regulation. The competent branches of the Secretariat
General study the existing national legislation and draft the common legal text in
cooperation with experts from the member states. The draft is then presented to the
specialised sub-committees of the Council for review. These committees can request
modifications according to the wishes of the member states or decide to recommend its
adoption by the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council. Finally, the Ministerial
Council or the Supreme Council decides whether to adopt the legislation and whether to
accord it binding or exemplary character. Legislation has to be ratified by the relevant
national bodies of member states, but this tends to be no obstacle given the consensus-driven
approach to adopting legislation at the GCC level.
21 The Standardization and Metrology Organization was
established in 1982 to define common product standards and
measures. As most of the other GCC members at the time did
not have national standards offices, the Saudi Arabian
Standards Organization was entrusted with the operation of
this agency until 2001, when the GCC Heads of State decided
to set up an independent common standards organisation.
22 The decision to set up the Commercial Arbitration Center in
Bahrain was taken in 1993 with the adoption of its charter by
the Supreme Council. The Center was declared fully
operational in 1995.
23 The Patent Office is the youngest agency in the GCC and is
located in Riyadh. The Supreme Council approved its statute
in 1992, and the Office became operational in 1998. By
October 2002 it had granted some 30 Gulf patents.27
ECB






These objectives were further spelt out in the
1982 “Unified Economic Agreement”, which
laid down the principles of a GCC free trade
area, the free cross-border movement of GCC
citizens, and the coordination of banking,
financial and monetary policies. Over the
following two decades the integration process
saw periods not only of impressive progress but
also of stagnation. While the implementation
of the free trade area began in 1983 and the first
services sectors were opened to GCC citizens
as early as 1986, it took more than ten years
after the initial deliberations in the Ministerial
Council in 1989 to agree on a common external
tariff. In the late 1990s, however, the
integration process gained new momentum,
culminating in the ratification of the new
“Economic Agreement between the States of
the Cooperation Council” at the Muscat
Summit in 2001, which replaced the Unified
Economic Agreement. The new document sets
ambitious targets for the next stage of the
integration process, drawing up a road map for
the creation of a fully integrated common
market and the preparation of a monetary
union. Table 6 presents the evolution of the
integration project as reflected in these two
agreements.
In 2001 the Supreme Council agreed on a
timetable for the implementation of some of the
envisaged stages of integration. This timetable
calls for the implementation of the customs
union in January 2003; the establishment of
implementation guidelines, including
convergence criteria, for the monetary union by
2005; the completion of the common market by
2007; and, finally, the adoption of the single
currency by 2010.
Given this sequence, the process of economic
and monetary integration in the GCC is designed
to follow an incremental approach, as it is
intended that monetary union shall be
established only after considerable groundwork
in terms of economic integration has been laid.
The scope of the GCC’s economic integration
objectives as laid out in the new Economic
Table 6 Integration objectives laid down in the economic agreements of 1982 and 2001
Unified Economic Agreement (1982) Economic Agreement (2001)
Trade in goods – Specifies operational principles for the – Specifies operational principles for the customs union,
free trade area, including rules of origin including a common external tariff and the single entry
point principle
– Provides for the subsequent creation of – Lays down principles for the common market, including the
a customs union harmonisation of all product standards
Trade in services – Makes an implicit reference – Common Market of the Gulf to include national treatment in
(exercise of economic activity) the field of services
Movement – Calls for coordination of financial and – Common Market of the Gulf to include national treatment of
of capital banking policies GCC capital
– National treatment to be accorded to investments owned by
GCC nationals
– Calls for complete integration of financial markets and
harmonisation of relevant regulations
Movement – Assures freedom of movement, work and – Extends the scope of national treatment to include explicitly:
of persons residence – employment in both the governmental and the private sector
– National treatment for GCC nationals – exercise of professions and all economic activities
regarding ownership, inheritance and – real estate and equity ownership
bequests, exercise of economic activity – social insurance and pensions, education, health and
– social services
Monetary – Commitment to coordinate monetary – Envisages a timetable for the implementation of
integration policies monetary union
– The prospect of monetary union is – Commitment to harmonise all relevant economic policies
mentioned – Calls for the establishment of convergence criteria28
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Agreement is remarkable and goes beyond most
other regional integration schemes worldwide.
The agreed measures address the most crucial
areas of policy coordination and harmonisation,
and appear to be mutually consistent and
complementary. The challenge for the GCC in
the coming years will be the comprehensive and
timely implementation of the envisaged stages
of integration.
3.3.2 THE CURRENT STATE OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
Free movement of goods
On 1 January 2003, a GCC customs union
finally came into effect with the enactment of a
common external tariff, a unified customs code
and the single entry point principle. This can be
regarded as an important landmark in the
GCC’s efforts to promote the free movement of
goods and to foster trade integration among its
member states. While the low degree of trade
integration achieved so far within the GCC (see
Chapter 2) may largely be explained by the
similar factor endowment of member states
(i.e. oil and gas), continuing regulatory barriers
also seem to have contributed to low levels of
intra-regional trade. Thus, an effort to tear
down these barriers and to foster trade
integration is required, in particular with
regard to non-oil trade.
Given that national tariff levels differed
substantially (in 1999 the simple mean tariff
was 12.6% in Saudi Arabia, compared with
4.8% in Oman), agreement on a customs union
was a considerable achievement. The fact that
in 2001, after a decade of discussion, GCC
Heads of State finally agreed on a tariff level
close to that of its most liberal members (5% on
all tariff lines except tobacco products (100%)
and exempted products) was therefore a display
of their commitment to the integration project.
In the same year they also adopted a unified
customs code and a binding schedule for the
introduction of the customs union, and in
December 2002 a set of implementation
provisions was approved, including a list of
duty-exempt products (417 tariff lines).
The single entry point principle adopted in the
context of the customs union implies that all
customs procedures and duty payments for
goods imported from outside the GCC are
finalised at the first point of entry, irrespective
of the final destination. In addition,
domestically produced goods no longer require
a certificate of origin in order to benefit from
duty-free treatment in other GCC countries.24
Besides some transitory difficulties in the
implementation of the customs union, which
can be regarded as “teething problems”, a
number of trade barriers still remain in place in
accordance with the agreed rules. The
implementation measures provide for a three-
year transition period, during which internal
customs procedures are to be rolled back
gradually. However, even in the final stage,
beginning in 2006, intra-GCC border measures
are set to remain, albeit limited to inspections
for prohibited and restricted goods and animal
and plant quarantine measures. In order to
eventually eliminate the need for border
inspections and reap the full benefits of
integration, further efforts may therefore be
warranted in terms of adopting common health
standards and solving the problem of
prohibited goods through internal rather than
border measures.
In institutional terms, the Customs Union
Committee, which is composed of national
customs directors and reports to the Committee
for Financial and Economic Cooperation, is
responsible for monitoring and steering the
implementation of the newly established
customs union. Thus, the customs union
follows the same intergovernmental approach
24 The latter is a crucial point with regard to the free movement
of goods in the GCC. A free trade area had already been
established in the GCC in 1983, allowing for the duty-free
movement of goods produced in any of the member states.
However, imported goods still had to undergo customs
procedures when crossing internal borders. Moreover, since
GCC producers had to meet a 40% minimum domestic content
rule if they wanted to benefit from duty-free treatment,
burdensome procedures had to be followed to establish the
national origin of manufactured goods. To overcome these
inherent limitations and allow the free circulation of goods, a
political step had to be taken, namely to agree a common
external tariff schedule and to create a customs union.29
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that characterises the integration process in the
GCC in general. This may however pose a
challenge for the future, as the establishment of
a customs union essentially forces member
states to pursue common policies, rather than
simply to coordinate their national policies, on
the most important aspects of trade policy, in
particular external tariffs. There are
indications that it will not be easy to deal with
such matters smoothly in such a consensus-
based intergovernmental framework in the
absence of an effective dispute settlement
mechanism or a supranational body with the
right to make authoritative interpretations.
Moreover, the free movement of goods remains
incomplete even in a customs union, unless
national product and production standards are
sufficiently harmonised or mutually
recognised.25 GCC Heads of State were clearly
aware of the importance of harmonised
standards when they decided in 2001, as a
complementary measure to the creation of the
customs union, to upgrade the Gulf
Standardization and Metrology Organization
from a branch of the Saudi Arabian Standards
Organization to an independent agency. In
addition, the implementing provisions for the
customs union establish the principle of mutual
recognition of national standards. The
European experience suggests that, pending the
eventual complete harmonisation of national
standards, the success of the common market
will crucially depend on the implementation of
the principle of mutual standard recognition.
Free movement of services
The free movement of services in the GCC
seems to be less advanced than the free
movement of goods, although in the case of
services, an assessment is more complicated.
From a purely economic point of view, trade in
services is analogous to trade in goods.
However, legal barriers to trade in services are
much harder to assess or indeed to eliminate
than barriers to trade in goods. Whereas the
latter are essentially a matter of customs
regulations and product standards, the former
are usually deeply entrenched in national
legislation. A brief glance at various areas of
the implementation of the common market in
the GCC reveals a highly heterogeneous
picture across countries and sectors. For
instance, while traffic legislation in a given
country might already have been adapted to
allow drivers to obtain insurance in another
GCC country, its commercial law might still
not allow foreign accountancy firms to operate
on its soil.
However, a few horizontal issues point to the
overall degree of integration in the field of
services. Major determinants of the freedom of
trade in services are the freedoms of movement
of capital and of natural persons, as many
business models require either consumers or
producers to cross a border (supply modes 2
and 4 under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS)), or require the commercial
presence of the supplier (supply mode 3), and
therefore some capital investment. A relatively
high level of integration has been achieved in
terms of movement of capital as well as people
(these aspects are discussed in more detail
in the following two sub-sections). The
implementation of the common market is, by
contrast, still incomplete with respect to laws
of incorporation and of commercial real
estate ownership, which are essential for cross-
border commercial presence. Similarly, the
recognition of professional skills and diplomas
and the principle of equal tax treatment have
not yet been fully accomplished. The former is
not only important to foster the free movement
of services, but also to increase labour mobility
in general.
25 As most GCC member states have only established national
standardisation authorities relatively recently and in the past
relied in many cases on foreign (mainly British) standards, the
differences in national standards among GCC states should be
relatively limited. Another favourable factor in this respect
was the creation in 1983 of the Gulf Standardization and
Metrology Organization, which has since its creation issued
more than 1,700 Gulf standards.30
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While there seems to be a strong commitment
to eliminate such barriers over time, GCC
countries might not be able to reap the benefits
of free movement of services due to another
limiting factor: the prevalence of monopolies
and public entities in the services sector. In
countries where water, for instance, is provided
free of charge, there is little opportunity for
efficiency gains to be achieved by allowing
companies from other GCC countries to
compete. While privatisation efforts are also
underway in the services sector at the national
level in all GCC member states, there seems to
be some scope for further action in this regard
at the GCC level.
Free movement of capital
GCC member states share a tradition of
relatively liberal capital accounts. However, a
number of regulatory and structural factors
have limited cross-border capital mobility, and
there seems to be a commitment in the GCC to
eliminate these regulatory barriers. Living up
to this commitment and enhancing capital
mobility with the objective of achieving the
full integration of GCC financial and banking
markets is particularly important in view of the
plans for monetary union.
The factors that have impeded intra-GCC
capital flows include restrictions on foreign
ownership of equity and real estate, regulatory
barriers to cross-country banking operations,
and underdeveloped capital markets (see
Chapter 2). In recent years, many GCC
governments have given higher priority to
attracting private investment, and in particular
FDI, as a vehicle of economic diversification.
It is in this context that Article 5 of the 2001
Economic Agreement calls for the creation of
an “investment climate characterised by
stability and transparency”, including the
complete integration of capital markets in the
region. To achieve this goal, member states
committed themselves to harmonising their
regulations regarding investment, banking
and financial markets, to eliminating all
discriminatory regulations regarding the
trading and ownership of assets, and thereby
effectively to removing all barriers to cross-
border banking services and investment.
The number of banks operating across GCC
countries is still very limited,26 although all
member countries allow in principle the
establishment of banks from other GCC
countries on their territory. This may be due to
the fact that the equal treatment principle has
not yet been implemented completely in
national banking and commercial legislation.
Furthermore, while basic harmonisation has
been achieved, legislation in the areas of
banking regulation and supervision continues
to display differences across countries,
complicating the establishment of cross-border
branches by GCC banks. In addition to the
regulatory environment, which is set to be
improved by implementing the provisions of
the Economic Agreement, some structural
barriers to the integration of banking systems
deserve attention, such as the low level of intra-
GCC trade. Further trade integration, as
recently observed with the increase in intra-
GCC trade, will be an important source of
demand for cross-border financial services.
This points to the need to follow a truly
comprehensive approach with regard to the
implementation of the common market, as the
“four freedoms” are intrinsically linked to each
other.
With regard to capital markets, the most
prominent restriction to capital mobility in the
past was the requirement in all GCC countries
of majority national ownership in all
corporations. This is now being abandoned or
replaced by the principle of majority ownership
by GCC nationals. In some countries, share
ownership in certain sectors, such as finance, is
still restricted to nationals. In 2002, 28% of
GCC joint stock companies were covered by
such provisions. Apart from these restrictions,
stock markets seem to be freely accessible to
GCC investors, and a number of cross-listing
agreements between stock exchanges now
provide national companies with access to
26 Bahrain is an exception in this respect due to its role as an
offshore financial centre.31
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GCC capital.27 However, up till now the
number of cross-listed stocks and their share in
market capitalisation appears to be very small.
In addition, the high proportion of publicly
owned companies in the GCC economies has so
far limited the potential for gains from cross-
border capital mobility. By analogy with what
has been noted with regard to the liberalisation
of services, there is a strong case for stepping
up privatisation efforts in order to benefit fully
from the efficiency gains that the common
market and, to an even greater extent, the
monetary union entail.
Free movement of natural persons
The free movement of natural persons is fairly
advanced for GCC nationals. However,
expatriates are not covered by the integration
endeavours in this area. Given the large share
of expatriates in the population and, in
particular, in the workforce, this may limit the
overall economic gains from the completion of
the common market.
By and large, GCC nationals are free to travel to
all member states without having to obtain a
visa, and, in most cases, even without a passport.
They largely enjoy equal treatment regarding
employment in the private sector, and are
entitled to temporary and permanent residence.
Implementation of the national treatment
principle is also relatively advanced with respect
to personal real estate ownership, employment
in the private sector, education, health and social
services and the exercise of most professions
(except those included in a negative list). At the
same time, equal treatment is still not fully
ensured in other areas such as employment in the
public sector and access to social insurance and
pension schemes. However, efforts continue to
be made to implement the principle of Gulf
Citizenship in these areas, as well as to reach full
mutual recognition of diplomas and certificates
of qualification.
As a result, the number of GCC citizens who
have obtained a licence to conduct economic
activity in other member states remains
extremely low. Only in the UAE does their
number exceed 0.1% of the total population.
Similarly, only around 0.15% of GCC citizens
own real estate in another GCC country.
The free movement of non-nationals between
GCC countries is not explicitly a subject of the
integration objectives as set out in the
Economic Agreement. Some countries grant
expatriate residents of other GCC states
preferential visa treatment, and there seem to
be plans to introduce a common GCC visa for
foreign businesspeople. As long as there is no
common visa or residence permit for expatriate
workers, however, labour mobility will not
apply to a significant proportion of the labour
force in GCC countries. Given the importance
of expatriate labour in the private sector in
GCC countries, this may represent an
impediment to economic integration,
especially in the areas of trade in services
(which often involves the movement of natural
persons) and cross-border transport. It also
raises the issue whether the overall degree of
labour mobility is compromised, which can
play an important stabilising role in a monetary
union in the event of asymmetric shocks.
However, in this context it has to be taken into
account that even in the absence of free
migration of expatriates between GCC member
states, overall labour mobility remains high,
given the ability to adjust swiftly the overall
number of expatriate workers in a country
when, for instance, it faces the consequences of
an asymmetric shock.
27 No information was available on private bond markets;
however, these are of marginal importance in the GCC
countries.32
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4 ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE OF GCC
MEMBER STATES
When analysing economic convergence, a
crude distinction can be made between
monetary, fiscal and structural convergence.
Monetary convergence refers to variables
mainly determined by monetary policy, such
as inflation, interest rates and exchange
rates, whereas fiscal convergence refers to
indicators such as budget deficits and debt
levels, which are strongly influenced by fiscal
policy. Structural convergence is not as
straightforward to assess in quantitative terms,
and refers mainly to an increasing similarity in
economic structures and economic dynamics.
This is relevant for a monetary union, as it
reduces the probability and severity that a
group of countries’ economies will be hit by
asymmetric shocks. Given that economic
dynamics will never be identical and that some
asymmetric shocks will always remain, the
capability to cope with such shocks is also of
relevance. There are a wide range of indicators
that can provide information on structural
convergence. The most commonly used are
variables such as income levels, GDP growth
cycles and the sectoral structure of the
economy, which can provide hints to assess this
aspect.
This chapter reviews the state of monetary,
fiscal and structural convergence among GCC
member states. When looking at the overall
picture concerning the convergence of GCC
economies, the following features stand out:
(i) The degree of monetary convergence among
GCC economies with low and similar inflation
rates, co-moving interest rates and low interest
rate differentials and stable exchange rates is
remarkable, and exceeds the convergence
achieved in this field by euro area countries in a
comparable period prior to the introduction of
the euro in 1999. In particular, the degree of
exchange rate stability for almost two decades
is noteworthy, all the more so in an
environment of relatively free capital flows.
(ii) Fiscal convergence is less marked than
monetary convergence in GCC economies.
While government revenues and expenditure
and the budget balance tend to move in parallel
due to the dependency of public finances on oil
revenues, the level of deficits/surpluses varies
significantly between countries. In some
countries, high and persistent fiscal deficits
have become the norm until recently and have
led to a build-up of public debt, the level of
which also seems to vary significantly between
GCC member states. An in-depth assessment of
this would require enhanced transparency of
data.
(iii) Concerning structural convergence,
neither the pattern of growth cycles, nor the
differences in GDP per capita between member
states, nor the economic structure of member
states provide an argument against further
monetary integration and the introduction of a
single currency. Growth cycles tend to be
relatively synchronised due to the role of oil in
the economy. Differences in GDP per capita are
significant, but not more so than in the euro
area, and as such seem to form no impediment
to a functioning monetary union. Economic
structures are broadly similar, thus reducing
the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and the
need to resort to exchange rate adjustments.
(iv) An important qualification has to be made
regarding the possible future development of
economic structures. The high degree of
structural homogeneity cannot be extrapolated
into the future, as progress in diversification
efforts might reduce the structural similarities
of the GCC economies. If some countries
diversify more successfully and faster than
others (i.e. if the differences in the degree of oil
dependency widen significantly between
countries), or if diversification takes a
different path in individual GCC countries,
then the likelihood of asymmetric shocks may
increase. Thus, by achieving the reasonable
key policy objective of economic
diversification in the GCC, which could even
be supported by a single currency, the potential
macroeconomic costs associated with a33
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monetary union might increase, particularly as
it is conceivable that a GCC monetary union
could in the future comprise both highly oil/gas
dependent countries and non-oil/gas dependent
countries. However, this point should not be
seen as a prima facie argument against
monetary union in the GCC. Rather, it points to
the increasing importance of the economies’
ability to deal with shocks using tools other
than nominal exchange rate adjustments, in the
event that asymmetric shocks become more
likely in the wake of ongoing diversification
after monetary union. This lends further
support to efforts to liberalise product markets
and to enhance labour market flexibility and
labour mobility in GCC economies.
4.1 MONETARY CONVERGENCE
This section analyses monetary convergence in
GCC member states, focusing on inflation
rates, interest rates and exchange rate stability.
4.1.1 INFLATION
The GCC countries have been characterised by
relatively low inflation rates over the past two
decades, and inflation rates have also tended
to move broadly in parallel between
countries during this period. Inflation has
rarely exceeded 5%, which was the case only in
a few countries in exceptional years. This
period of a high degree of price stability has
lasted since the mid-1980s, but was preceded
by significantly higher inflation rates in the
1970s when, as a result of the oil boom,
inflation rates reached double-digit levels
before starting to stabilise around 1980 (see
Chart 15).
The average inflation rate over the last two
decades has been highest in the UAE (3.7%)
and lowest in Saudi Arabia and Oman (0%).
The difference between the highest and lowest
inflation rates in GCC countries seems to have
gradually narrowed and to have become less
volatile over the past 10 years, pointing to
increased convergence (see Chart 16). Over the
past two years, average inflation in the
GCC has somewhat increased to reach 2.1%28
in 2004 owing to recent oil price peaks, with
inflation ranging from 0.8% in Oman to 3.5%
in Qatar.
Turning to country-specific developments,
inflation rates were temporarily higher after
the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in several
GCC countries, most notably in Kuwait itself in
28 Unweighted average.
Chart 15 Inflation in GCC member states
(annual percentage changes)
Sources: IMF WEO and IFS.
Chart 16 Difference between highest and
lowest inflation rate in GCC member states
(percentage points)
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view of the reconstruction of the country. Qatar
exhibited relatively high inflation rates in the
mid-1990s due to dynamic growth in the natural
gas sector. In addition, inflation rates in the UAE
were persistently higher than in other GCC
countries in the late 1980s and the first half of the
1990s. However, this development does not
seem to have been driven by significantly
divergent economic developments or monetary
policy, and, despite a real appreciation of the
currency, does not seem to have led to a loss of
competitiveness of UAE exports.
In conclusion, the high degree of inflation
convergence of GCC member states at low
levels of inflation over the past 20 years is
remarkable. The major factor explaining the
persistently low inflation rates is the (at least
de facto) continued peg of the currencies to the
US dollar (see sub-section 4.1.3). The GCC
countries’ choice of an external anchor for
monetary policy has obviously been credible
and served them well in the past to anchor
inflation expectations and to import monetary
stability from the anchor economy. Another
factor that seems to have contributed to low
inflation rates has been the relatively low level
of central bank credit to governments in GCC
countries. Unlike in some other Middle East
countries, GCC member states did not
extensively use monetary policy to
accommodate budget deficits. This was
facilitated by accumulated foreign assets,
which they could resort to in times of budgetary
strain, for instance in periods of low oil prices.
Moreover, the low level of inflation achieved
in all GCC member states in the last 20 years
points to a shared policy preference for price
stability, which also seems to enjoy support
among the respective populations.
4.1.2 INTEREST RATES
Over the past 20 years, interest rates in GCC
member states have co-moved in similar
ranges. The high degree of interest rate
convergence reflects the inflation convergence
and the degree of exchange rate stability among
GCC member states, resulting from their long-
standing orientation towards the US dollar.
Hence, interest rates have tended to move in
line with US interest rates (see Chart 17). The
spread between GCC and US interest rates is
generally low and reflects the credibility of the
exchange rate peg. The spread tends to be
influenced by oil price developments, in
particular in the case of Saudi Arabia, where
falling oil prices normally lead to a spread
widening (see Chart 18).
It should be noted that the Gulf region is
generally characterised by short-term credit
relations. Therefore, long-term interest rates,
Chart 17 Interest rates in GCC member
states
(3-month deposit rate, percentages)
Sources: IMF IFS, and national sources for UAE.
1) Certificates of deposit interest rates.
Chart 18 Interest rate spreads Saudi
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for instance for ten-year bonds, do not exist on
a comparable basis. The analysis of interest
rate convergence must thus focus on short term
interest rates, for which a three-month deposit
rate is chosen here in view of data availability
and comparability.
Specific developments can be observed for
Kuwait in the early 1990s connected to the
situation after the Iraqi invasion; for Oman in
the second half of the 1990s due to interest rate
regulations; and for Qatar, whose interest rate
was fixed until 1991 but, once it was allowed to
fluctuate, moved in line with the interest rates
of the other GCC countries. In the last decade
the spread between the highest and the lowest
rate was highest in 1993 with 4.1 percentage
points (7.1% in Kuwait versus 3.0% in
Bahrain), and lowest in 1995 with 0.8
percentage point (6.5% in Kuwait versus 5.7%
in Bahrain).
4.1.3 EXCHANGE RATES
The degree of nominal exchange rate stability
among GCC currencies in the past two decades
is remarkable and probably unparalleled in the
world economy. It reflects the long-standing
common orientation of GCC countries’
exchange rate policies towards the US dollar
(see Chart 19). The orientation of GCC
countries’ exchange rate policies towards a
common external anchor has not only limited
intra-GCC currency fluctuations, but has also
significantly contributed to the convergence of
inflation and interest rates, as described in the
previous sections.
Since the beginning of 2003 all GCC currencies
have been both de jure and de facto pegged to
the US dollar as part of the GCC’s road map to
introduce a single currency. The peg is a
conventional peg according to the IMF
classification and, with the exception of the
Kuwaiti dinar, there is no horizontal band
around the rate at which the currencies are
pegged to the US dollar. The Kuwaiti dinar
fluctuates in a band of ± 3.5% around the
central rate. As a result of the common US
dollar peg, there are no exchange rate
fluctuations between five of the GCC
currencies, and only limited fluctuations
between those five and the Kuwaiti dinar.
The transition to a common US dollar peg with
the aim of further enhancing exchange rate
stability among GCC currencies and bringing
their exchange rate regimes formally into line
in view of the planned monetary union did not
require any major modifications to the GCC
countries’ long-standing exchange rate
regimes, with the exception to a limited extent
of Kuwait. In fact, the exchange rate regimes of
GCC countries had already shown a high
degree of homogeneity for an extended period.
The Omani riyal has been de facto pegged
to the US dollar since 1973; the Bahraini dinar,
the Qatari riyal and the UAE dirham since
1980; and the Saudi riyal since 1986.
Notwithstanding the de facto peg to the US
dollar, until the beginning of 2003 Bahrain,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had de
jure29 pegged their currencies to the Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) currency basket, with
a fluctuation band of ± 7.25% in the cases of
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. Oman was the
29 As notified to the IMF in the Annual Reports on Exchange
Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
Chart 19 Exchange rates against USD for the
GCC member states
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only GCC country which also had a de jure US
dollar peg. Thus the transition to a common US
dollar peg in early 2003 meant only an
adjustment of the de jure exchange rate regime
to the long-standing de facto regime.
Kuwait’s exchange rate regime differed
slightly from those of the other five GCC
member states. Until the beginning of 2003 the
Kuwaiti dinar was pegged to a basket of
currencies of the country’s main trading and
financial partners. The composition of the
basket was not disclosed, but obviously the US
dollar had a dominant weight, as only minor
fluctuations occurred vis-à-vis the US dollar,
and as a result, exchange rate fluctuations vis-
à-vis the other five GCC currencies were also
very limited. Nevertheless, the limited
exchange rate flexibility enjoyed by Kuwait in
the past explains the fact that under the present
common US dollar peg, the Kuwaiti dinar is the
only currency which is granted a narrow
fluctuation band.
The last major adjustments of parities vis-à-vis
the US dollar, and thus among the five GCC
currencies pegged to the US dollar, took place
in 1986 (in Oman and Saudi Arabia), while the
parities of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE have
remained largely unchanged since 1979.30
Accordingly, there has been almost complete
exchange rate stability among five of the six
GCC currencies over the last 18 years. In the
last decade, the fluctuations of the Kuwaiti
dinar did not exceed ± 3.5% vis-à-vis either the
US dollar or the other five GCC currencies.
With regard to real exchange rate
developments, higher inflation rates have
induced an appreciation of the real effective
exchange rates of the Kuwaiti dinar, the Qatari
riyal and the UAE dirham over the last decade.
Interestingly, although the real appreciation is
significant, in particular for the UAE dirham,
this has not resulted in a loss of
competitiveness or a rising current account
deficit and, subsequently, in pressure on the
nominal exchange rate, as standard economic
theory would suggest. This may be explained
by stronger productivity growth in the UAE,
which is more advanced in its degree of
diversification (see Chapter 2). However, the
dominance of oil in foreign trade may also be
part of the explanation, as the price of and
demand for oil is not influenced by domestic
price developments.
Exchange rate stability among the GCC
countries is all the more remarkable as it has
evolved in an environment of relatively open
capital accounts, and thus cannot be explained
by foreign exchange restrictions. Moreover,
this exchange rate stability has withstood
various instances of severe economic and
political turbulence, such as large oil price
fluctuations, crises in various emerging market
economies with a global impact, the 1990/1991
Gulf War following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, and most recently the military
intervention in Iraq in 2003.
This stability can be explained by three main
factors: (i) the similarity of economic
structures of GCC member states, notably the
role of oil in their economies, which reduces
the potential for asymmetric shocks and thus
the need to resort to exchange rate adjustments;
(ii) economic policies in GCC member states,
which have largely been consistent with the
exchange rate pegs and have not undermined
their credibility; and (iii) the accumulation of
significant foreign exchange reserves by GCC
member states, which have underpinned the
credibility of the peg and deterred speculative
attacks. Such attacks occasionally occur,
mainly in the wake of low oil prices, and tend
primarily to target the Saudi riyal, as it exhibits
by far the most liquid foreign exchange market
among GCC currencies. Past attacks have led
to a temporary widening of interest rate spreads
vis-à-vis the US and to interventions in the
foreign exchange markets to defend the peg. No
formal arrangement exists among GCC
monetary agencies and central banks to support
each others’ currencies when the exchange rate
30 A very small adjustment of the UAE dirham took place in
1997.37
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peg is under strain. However, it is widely
acknowledged that monetary agencies and
central banks would be able to coordinate
support informally on an ad hoc basis if deemed
necessary.
The US dollar orientation of the GCC
countries’ exchange rate policies is explained
by the fact that oil revenues, which constitute
their main income flow from exports, are priced
in US dollars. The US dollar pegs thus serve the
aim of stabilising export revenues, and, given
the prominent role of oil revenues in GCC
member states’ budgets, fiscal revenues as
well. The repercussion of these US dollar
pegs is that the GCC countries’ terms of
trade are to a considerable extent exposed to
fluctuations in the US dollar vis-à-vis other
major currencies, given their foreign trade
patterns (see Chapter 2).
4.2 FISCAL CONVERGENCE
Fiscal convergence is examined here on the
basis of deficit-to-GDP ratios and debt-to-GDP
ratios in order to provide a cursory overview of
the fiscal situation.31
4.2.1 BUDGET DEFICITS
While GCC budget balance-to-GDP ratios tend
to exhibit a considerable degree of co-
movement, significant differences regarding
the level of deficits/surpluses remain (see
Chart 20).
Three major periods can be distinguished
within the past three decades. In the 1970s,
following the dramatic increases in oil prices,
GCC budgets exhibited surpluses which were
in some cases massive in relation to GDP. The
early 1980s marked the transition to deficits,
which remained the norm until the late 1990s.
Most recently, fiscal revenues have
significantly increased due to the pick-up in oil
prices, and budget balances have moved into
surplus again. However, the magnitude of the
budget balance-to-GDP ratios differed
between GCC member states, with Saudi
Arabia exhibiting the highest annual average
deficit (-8.8% of GDP) in the period 1985-
2004, and Oman the lowest (-0.1% of GDP).
Unsurprisingly, the budget balances are
strongly influenced by oil price developments,
and thus show a significant degree of co-
movement (see Chart 21). However, country-
specific developments leading to a divergence
from the general trend can be identified, such
as the high Kuwaiti deficit in the early 1990s
due to the reconstruction effort following the
Iraqi invasion.
The underlying components of the budget
deficits – government revenue and expenditure
– also exhibit a high degree of co-movement,
although to a slightly different extent. Revenue
growth tends to be highly correlated in all GCC
member states, due to the high dependency of
government budgets on oil as the major source
of revenue. Thus revenue in all GCC countries
increases sharply in times of high oil prices,
and decreases when oil prices fall. Government
expenditure growth tends to follow closely
revenue growth and thus oil prices;
accordingly, spending cycles of GCC member
states are also correlated, although to a slightly
smaller extent than revenues, with Kuwait in
the early 1990s being the major outlier.
31 This does not imply that these would be appropriate fiscal
convergence criteria in the GCC context in view of the role of
oil in budget revenues (see Chapter 5, Section 5 on the issue of
fiscal convergence criteria in the GCC).
Chart 20 Budget balances in GCC member
states
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Government spending is mainly driven by
revenue and thus tends to be pro-cyclical.32 As
a result of the large inflow of oil revenues in the
1970s, GCC member states launched large
development projects and introduced far-
reaching schemes for welfare spending and
subsidies, thereby sharply raising the level of
government spending. Once revenues declined,
it proved difficult to reduce spending, leading
to two decades of deficits since the early 1980s.
4.2.2 PUBLIC DEBT
Based on available data, the ratio of total public
gross debt to GDP in GCC countries seems to
vary significantly and reflects different paths
of fiscal policies pursued over the past two
decades. Saudi Arabia, with a debt-to-GDP
ratio of over 80%, has accumulated by far
the largest public debt burden among the
GCC countries, while the UAE exhibits the
lowest debt ratio, at below 10% of GDP (see
Chart 22).33 Recently, gross debt levels have
tended to decline. Several GCC countries have
used high budgetary revenues as a result of high
oil prices to reduce public debt significantly,
notably Saudi Arabia.
Chart 21 Oil price and budget deficits in GCC member states
Sources: IMF WEO and Bloomberg.
oil price (USD per barrel) (left-hand scale)
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32 See Fasano and Wang (2002), who provide empirical evidence
that government spending in GCC countries follows revenues.
33 The latest available and comparable data for all six GCC
countries refer to 2002.39
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Data on public debt in GCC countries have to be
interpreted with great caution, however.
Different sources point to very different levels of
debt, and the net position of the public sector in
particular remains unclear, as several GCC
countries have reportedly accumulated large
foreign assets which are not disclosed.
Furthermore, it is difficult to gauge the
appropriate delineation of the public sector. For
instance, in Saudi Arabia, a large proportion of
public debt is owed to public social security
institutions. Given the importance of the public
debt level for the sustainability of public
finances, an improvement in data availability
and quality as well as a comparable,
comprehensive and concise delineation of what
constitutes public debt in GCC member states
seems indispensable for a meaningful
assessment of fiscal convergence.
4.3 STRUCTURAL CONVERGENCE
This section examines structural convergence
with a view to the likeliness of asymmetric
shocks and the availability of adjustment
mechanisms, focusing on sectoral structures,
trade patterns, labour markets, GDP growth
and GDP per capita.
4.3.1 ASYMMETRIC SHOCKS AND ADJUSTMENT
MECHANISMS IN THE CONTEXT OF
MONETARY UNION
A key precondition for a viable monetary union
is the existence of economic structures in the
prospective member states that allow for a
smooth conduct of a single monetary policy.
The macroeconomic cost of relinquishing
national monetary policy in the context of a
currency union depends on a) the frequency and
severity with which member states are exposed
to asymmetric shocks, and b) the adjustment
mechanisms available to mitigate the impact of
such shocks, given that adjustments in national
monetary policies and nominal exchange
rates are impossible.34 The most important
mechanisms that can facilitate this adjustment
process are domestic price flexibility and, in
particular, wage flexibility, cross-border factor
mobility and fiscal and financial integration.
Where asymmetric shocks are rare or can easily
be mitigated or dispersed among member
states, a single monetary policy focused on the
aggregated macroeconomic situation of the
currency area should not present significant
problems for any particular region. By
contrast, in the presence of shocks that
persistently affect some but not all member
states, it might be difficult to devise a single
monetary policy that is appropriate for all.
The past record of economic convergence can
shed some light on the similarities and
differences of economic structures in the
member states that may either facilitate or
impede a single monetary policy. Certain
economic features, such as the degree of
similarity in the sectoral structure, the degree
of trade integration, labour market flexibility,
per capita income levels, the co-movement of
GDP growth cycles and exchange rate stability,
can provide indicators of the frequency and
severity with which GCC member states have
been hit by asymmetric shocks in the past, and
of their ability to cope with such shocks.
4.3.2 SECTORAL STRUCTURES
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the sectoral
structures of GCC economies exhibit a high
degree of similarity owing to their common
dependency on oil, and to a lesser extent on
natural gas as well. The oil and gas sector
Chart 22 Total government gross debt of
GCC member states
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34 For an overview of the literature on optimum currency area
(OCA) theory, see Mongelli (2002).40
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accounts for more than one-third of GDP in the
GCC as a whole, and, except for Bahrain, is the
largest sector in the economy, ranging from
roughly a quarter in Bahrain to almost 60% in
Qatar (see Chart 10, Chapter 2).
The similarity in sectoral structures reduces the
GCC economies’ susceptibility to asymmetric
shocks. In this context, it is worth recalling the
GCC economies’ extraordinary record of
exchange rate stability. The structural features
of the GCC economies (most notably the fact
that the competitiveness of their external sector
is independent of domestic price and wage
developments, and that oil price changes
constitute symmetric shocks in view of their
shared oil dependency) have enabled member
states to pursue such policies without incurring
significant costs in terms of employment or
inflation. The stability of nominal exchange
rates can thus be understood as an indication
that the GCC economies (i) have not been
subjected to frequent and severe asymmetric
shocks, given their similar economic structure,
and (ii) have so far been able to cope with the
few shocks they have faced, such as the
invasion of Kuwait, without having to resort to
nominal exchange rate adjustments or to make
use of their monetary autonomy.
The differences in the economic structures of
GCC countries may, however, increase in the
future in the course of further economic
diversification. While all GCC countries have
declared that diversification and the reduction
of their dependency on oil is a major goal of
economic policy, the pace and direction of
diversification may differ from country to
country. In particular, the pace of
diversification could be influenced by the fact
that some GCC countries face the exhaustion of
their oil reserves at current levels of production
during the next two decades (i.e. Bahrain and
Oman, see Chapter 2, sub-sections 2.2.1 and
2.3.1), while others, like Kuwait, the UAE and
Saudi Arabia, will not run out of oil reserves for
a much longer period. Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the economic
structures of GCC countries will be more
heterogeneous in 20 to 30 years’ time than they
are today. The increasing heterogeneity may
foster economic integration and intra-GCC
trade. At the same time, price flexibility in
product and factor markets will become an
increasingly important alternative adjustment
tool, once the option of nominal exchange rate
adjustments has been relinquished. In the same
vein, a well-designed system of intra-GCC
fiscal transfers could potentially contribute to
smoothing adjustments to asymmetric shocks
and to enhancing the cohesion of the monetary
union. The development of such adjustment
mechanisms will determine whether, in the
long term, the GCC, when exposed to more
frequent asymmetric shocks, will be in a
position to make smooth adjustments under a
single monetary policy, or will find itself in a
more problematic situation in which
Adjustment
Risk of mechanisms
asymmetric shocks Not developed Developed
Low unproblematic: unproblematic:
asymmetric shocks are rare, therefore no asymmetric shocks are rare and can be absorbed
imminent need for developed adjustment without endangering the cohesion of the monetary
mechanisms; union;
                                 GCC today
High problematic: unproblematic:
asymmetric shocks may put the sustainability asymmetric shocks may occur, but can be absorbed
of the monetary union at risk. without endangering monetary union.
                                 GCC 2030?                                  GCC 2030?
Table 7 Asymmetric shocks and adjustment mechanisms as future challenges to the GCC
monetary union41
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adjustment mechanisms are underdeveloped,
which may challenge the sustainability of the
monetary union (see Table 7).
4.3.3 TRADE PATTERNS
The level of trade integration in the GCC
is relatively low when looking at overall
exports (5% intra-GCC exports, see Chapter 2,
Table 2). However, this is due to the dominance
of oil in GCC exports. The share of intra-GCC
trade increases to roughly one-third when only
non-oil exports are taken into account,
although this share is still significantly
lower than the Chart for intra-trade in, for
example, the EU or the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (62% and 55%
respectively). While the share of intra-
GCC trade remains relatively low, it has
significantly increased over the past decade,
pointing to a process of trade integration which
has been facilitated by the efforts undertaken
by the GCC to eliminate barriers to intra-
regional trade (see Chapter 3).35 In terms of the
direction of trade, GCC countries tend to
exhibit a relatively homogeneous pattern, with
Asia as the major export destination and
Europe as the dominant source of imports (see
Chapter 2, Tables 1 and 2).
4.3.4 LABOUR MARKETS
Labour markets in the GCC, although
fragmented between nationals and expatriates,
appear to exhibit a considerable degree of
flexibility thanks in particular to the high share
of expatriate workers, whose number can be
adjusted in response to demand shocks.
Typically, nationals of GCC countries provide
the bulk of the labour force employed in the
public sector, which tends to exhibit many
rigidities, while expatriates are employed
mainly in the private sector, which is highly
flexible. This flexibility might be reduced,
however, in the course of ongoing efforts to
increase the participation of nationals in
private sector labour markets and to reduce the
reliance on expatriates. As national employees
may enjoy greater bargaining power than the
expatriates that currently dominate the private
sector labour force, it could be expected that
their increasing participation in labour markets
would give rise to institutional arrangements
entailing a higher degree of wage rigidity and
job protection. Therefore, it will be a policy
challenge to ensure that the process of
“nationalisation” of the labour force in the
private sector is not accompanied by a
reduction in the flexibility that currently
prevails. To promote stability in the context of
monetary union, the cross-border mobility of
(national and expatriate) labour will become
more important as an adjustment mechanism in
the future. By comparison with other regional
integration projects, the high degree of cultural
and linguistic homogeneity in the GCC, in
particular of nationals, should greatly facilitate
the achievement of labour mobility, which
would be enhanced by the removal of the
remaining legal obstacles to the free movement
of natural persons (see Chapter 3).
35 The overall impact of trade integration on economic
convergence is theoretically ambiguous. While strong trade
links can serve to transmit and thereby moderate asymmetric
shocks, they may also promote regional specialisation, and
thereby potentially increase the risk of asymmetric shocks.
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4.3.5 GDP GROWTH
GDP growth rates in the GCC countries tend to
be volatile and show some correlation over the
past three decades (see Chart 23). The growth
performance of GCC member states depends to
a great extent on oil, and the importance of the
oil sector in their economies explains well
the volatility in and a certain degree of
synchronisation of their business cycles. Large
oil price fluctuations can be interpreted as
symmetric shocks to GCC economies.
The 1970s and early 1980s were characterised
by very high GDP growth following the two
large increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1979,
while growth rates since the early 1980s have
been significantly lower. The most significant
deviation from the general growth cycle of
GCC countries can be observed for Kuwait in
the early 1990s due to the Iraqi invasion and the
subsequent reconstruction, which in economic
terms can be seen as an asymmetric shock
affecting one GCC member state in particular.
Another asymmetric development discernible
from these data is the rapid development of the
natural gas sector in Qatar in the mid-1990s.
Furthermore, GDP growth in Bahrain tends to
be less cyclical than in other GCC member
states, reflecting the country’s lower
dependence on oil. Looking at levels of growth
over the longer term, in the period 1980-2004
Oman, which was the country with the lowest
GDP per capita at the outset (see next section),
recorded the fastest GDP growth, with an
annual average increase of 6.1%. Saudi Arabia,
by contrast, exhibited the lowest average
growth (1.7%). Over the last decade, Qatar was
the fastest growing GCC economy with annual
growth averaging 9.1%, while Kuwait
followed by Saudi Arabia had the lowest
growth rates (2.1% and 2.3% respectively).
Although the difference between the highest
and the lowest growth rates among GCC
economies tends to be high, it has been
declining over the last two decades, with one
notable interruption in the early 1990s due to
the volatility of growth in Kuwait in the wake
of the Iraqi invasion (see Chart 24).
Naturally, growth in the non-oil sector of GCC
member states is less correlated than total GDP
growth, and the differences between countries
regarding the level of non-oil sector growth
also seem to be significant (see Chart 25).36
In particular, non-oil growth in the UAE
was consistently high throughout the 1990s,
making the UAE the most diversified economy
in the GCC besides Bahrain (see Chapter 2).
36 Based on available data for four GCC countries.
Chart 24 Difference between highest and
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Chart 25 Real growth of the non-oil private
sector in GCC member states
(annual percentage changes)





























4.3.6 GDP PER CAPITA
Differences in GDP per capita in PPP terms
between GCC member states are significant,
but are smaller than those that exist in the euro
area. GDP per capita growth has been subdued
over the past two decades, and differences in
GDP per capita have somewhat declined over
this period (see Chart 26).
GDP per capita rose steeply following the 1973
oil price increase and reached a peak in most
GCC countries in around 1980, after the second
oil price hike. It declined in the early 1980s and
broadly stagnated or only slightly increased
over the following decade in most countries.
The most marked developments over the past
decade have been the significant growth in
GDP per capita in Qatar due to the development
of the gas sector combined with relatively low
population growth, the decline and recovery in
GDP per capita in Kuwait in the early 1990s,
and Oman’s steady catching-up process. The
fact that GDP per capita has stagnated in many
GCC countries over an extended period shows
that real GDP growth was not sufficient to raise
per capita income levels in view of the
prevailing high population growth.
Differences in GDP per capita between GCC
member states, which were most pronounced




around 1980, when the GDP per capita of the
poorest member state (Oman) was only about
20% of that of the wealthiest in PPP terms
(Qatar), remain significant. These differences
decreased in the first half of the 1980s and
then remained broadly stable before widening
once again as a result of recent dynamic
development in Qatar. In 2004 Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait had the lowest GDP per capita in
PPP terms of the GCC countries, corresponding
to around 44% and 52% respectively of the
highest GDP per capita in Qatar. Although
large, the differences in GDP per capita
between GCC member states are, in fact,
smaller than those found in the euro area.37
Large differences in GDP per capita within a
monetary union may be relevant if, for
example, they result in a catching-up process,
which in turn may lead to structural differences
in inflation rates via the Balassa-Samuelson
effect, implying higher inflation rates in the
catching-up countries. While increases in
productivity in trading sectors may prevent a
direct loss of competitiveness, wage increases
can spill over into the non-trading sectors and
have an indirect bearing on competitiveness.
However, GDP per capita differences and their
development in the GCC are not primarily
driven by productivity, but rather by oil sector
developments, e.g. production increases. This
suggests that GDP per capita differences and
the Balassa-Samuelson effect are of less
relevance in the GCC context.
37 For example, in 2004 GDP per capita in Greece was 31.6% of
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5 SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA FOR THE GCC
Decision-makers in the GCC will face some
fundamental policy choices prior to the
introduction of a single currency, in particular
concerning the design and implementation of
convergence criteria. Therefore, after
demonstrating the relevance of assessing
economic convergence and the need for a basic
policy consensus, this chapter discusses
conceptual issues arising in the design of
convergence criteria which are relevant beyond
the concrete case of the GCC. Furthermore, the
role of multilateral surveillance is highlighted
as a tool for pursuing convergence both in the
run-up to monetary union and after the
introduction of a single currency. Given their
particular relevance in the GCC, fiscal
convergence criteria and the specifics applying
to the GCC context are dealt with in a final
section.
The main findings can be summarised as
follows:
(i) Given the relevance of assessing
economic convergence and in particular
the need for a policy consensus, the GCC
may benefit from a well-defined set of
criteria that capture monetary and fiscal
convergence. These criteria should be
monitored in an effective framework of
multilateral surveillance. Monetary
criteria are sufficient to function as entry
criteria, while fiscal criteria could play a
useful role both as entry criteria and as
permanent criteria, providing the
foundation for a set of fiscal rules and
policy coordination. The criteria will
function as a useful information tool for
assessing policies, and may additionally
serve as an anchor for expectations.
However, their role as a disciplining
device for policies may remain limited,
since there is consensus in the GCC that
they shall not represent selection criteria
determining which countries are allowed
to join the envisaged monetary union.
(ii) Monetary criteria could serve a slightly
different purpose in the GCC than in the
European context prior to the introduction
of the euro. This is due to the high degree
of monetary convergence already
achieved among GCC member states.
Monetary convergence criteria would thus
not require a major shift in policies to
achieve compliance, as was the case in
several EU Member States in the 1990s.
There is no need for disinflation, and
exchange rate parities have been stable for
two decades. The monetary convergence
criteria would therefore not be a newly
introduced anchor for policies and
expectations, or a disciplining device, but
rather a tool to check whether the high
degree of monetary convergence achieved
in the past has been maintained in the run-
up to monetary union (a “lock-in” of
monetary convergence).
(iii) Designing appropriate fiscal criteria
constitutes a challenge for GCC countries.
This is due partly to the much lower degree
of fiscal convergence achieved so far
compared with the monetary sphere, and
partly to the specific nature of the
budgetary situation in GCC countries as a
result of their heavy reliance on oil
revenues, which poses both short-term
challenges stemming from the volatility
and unpredictability of oil prices, and
long-term challenges in view of the
exhaustibility of oil reserves and the need
for asset accumulation to ensure fiscal
sustainability. Any fiscal framework will
face the unavoidable trade-off between
transparency and simplicity on the one
hand, and economic optimality
considerations and the desire for country-
specific tailor-made solutions on the
other.
(iv) In general, when designing convergence
criteria, a reference period for their
assessment that is meaningful in view of
the sustainability of convergence needs to
be defined. The thresholds need be chosen45
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so that they are both reasonable and
plausible in the specific circumstances of
the region, although it should be
acknowledged that these necessarily
involve some degree of arbitrariness. The
trade-off between the scope for
interpretation and political discretion on
the one hand and the credibility of the
criteria on the other also needs to be taken
into account. Finally, the quality and
availability of statistical data must be
sufficient to allow meaningful cross-
country comparisons in the GCC.
5.1 THE RELEVANCE OF ASSESSING
ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE
As with any monetary union, monetary union
and the introduction of a single currency38 in
the GCC necessarily require a single and
indivisible monetary and exchange rate policy.
Given this indivisibility principle, monetary
union is more than just a particularly tight
exchange rate arrangement, and a mere
coordination of national monetary policies is
not sufficient to sustain a single currency. A
single monetary and exchange rate policy has
to be geared to economic, monetary and
financial conditions in the single monetary area
as whole. This, first and foremost, implies
(i) that the participating member states have to
agree on the basic orientation of monetary and
exchange rate policy, and (ii) that member
states are deprived of monetary and exchange
rate policy as an adjustment tool to cope
with divergent economic developments, for
example in the event of an asymmetric shock.
These basic implications of a monetary union
point to the role of economic convergence both
during the process of monetary integration
prior to the introduction of a single currency
and afterwards. The level of economic
convergence achieved between countries
provides some indications as to whether the
following three prerequisites for a successful
monetary union are in place:
– a consensus on the role and objectives of
monetary policy and the exchange rate
regime;
– a shared commitment to fiscal policies that
at least do not contradict these objectives;
and
– economic structures that allow for the
smooth conduct of a single monetary
policy.
Hence, there is a case for closely monitoring
and thoroughly assessing the degree of
economic convergence prior to the introduction
of a single currency, and in particular the
sustainability of convergence, as it is essential
to achieve convergence not only at a specific
point in time, but on a sustainable basis.39 In
order to monitor and assess economic
convergence, appropriate criteria need to be
defined.
In terms of the distinction between monetary,
fiscal and structural convergence outlined in
the previous chapter, it is important to note that
a high degree of monetary convergence is in
fact achieved by the establishment of a
monetary union. The irrevocable fixing of
exchange rates and thus the elimination of any
exchange rate fluctuations between
participating countries is the constitutive
element of a monetary union. Once a single
monetary policy is being conducted, the scope
for differences in inflation rates and interest
rates is also limited, although these variables
are influenced by a variety of other factors,
such as national fiscal policies and wage
policies. Thus, the monitoring of monetary
38 Monetary union does not necessarily require the introduction
of a single currency. As the GCC has decided not only to
establish a monetary union but also to introduce a single
currency, the terms “establishment of monetary union” and
“introduction of a single currency” are used synonymously in
this paper, and the pros and cons of taking the latter step after
a monetary union has been established are not discussed.
39 In the EU the concept of sustainable convergence is enshrined
in the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article
121) with respect to EMU, and was emphasised in the
convergence reports of the European Monetary Institute
(EMI) between 1995 and 1998 in the run-up to the introduction
of the euro.46
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 31
June 2005
convergence is of prime importance prior to the
establishment of monetary union, in particular
to assess the direction of monetary policy and
the underlying degree of policy consensus,
although this motive becomes less relevant
once the monetary union has been established.
In contrast, the monitoring and assessment of
fiscal convergence is essential both before and
after the introduction of a single currency if
fiscal policy is not substantially centralised in
the monetary union. In a monetary union in
which fiscal policy remains a national
prerogative and national fiscal policies
determine the fiscal stance in the union as a
whole in the absence of a large,
macroeconomically dominant budget, as is
currently the case in the euro area and is also
likely to be the case in a GCC monetary union,
there is a strong case for both (i) fiscal
convergence in the run-up to the establishment
of monetary union, and (ii) a framework for
permanent fiscal policy coordination
underpinned by appropriate fiscal rules after
the monetary union has come into effect.
In a similar vein, while the introduction of a
single currency can be expected to encourage
the integration of goods, services and factor
markets, it by no means guarantees a sufficient
degree of structural convergence. Rather, a
high degree of multilateral surveillance and
coordination in many areas of economic policy
is required even after the implementation of
monetary union in order to ensure a level of
structural convergence that supports the
smooth conduct of a single monetary policy.
5.2 THE NEED FOR A POLICY CONSENSUS
An important prerequisite for a sustainable
monetary union is sufficient consensus on the
basic orientation of monetary policy, and on
economic policy in general. In particular,
consensus on the role and tasks of monetary
policy – in particular in the central banking
community, but also among other economic
policymakers and among the wider public – is
essential for the smooth functioning and
credibility of a monetary union.40 Crucial
questions in this context include the following.
Should price stability be the primary objective
of monetary policy, or should this objective be
on an equal footing with other potential
objectives? Should monetary policy be medium
term-oriented or used to fine-tune the
economy? Is there a trade-off between price
stability and growth in the medium and long
term? What is the preferred status of the central
bank? What should be the main features of the
exchange rate regime of the single currency? In
the absence of a basic consensus on such
fundamental monetary issues, diverging policy
preferences and views on the functioning of the
economy may lead to conflicts over the
orientation of a single monetary policy and may
possibly undermine the cohesion of a monetary
union. Economic convergence between
countries points to similar policy preferences
and views about the functioning of the
economy, and thus to a lower potential for
conflict once the monetary union has been
established. In the EU, such a consensus has
evolved over the last two decades, based on,
among other things, the conviction that price
stability should be the primary objective of
monetary policy, that monetary policy should
not be used to fine-tune the economy, that price
stability is the best contribution that monetary
policy can make to economic growth and
employment, that there is no trade-off between
price stability and growth in the medium and
long term and, lastly, that price stability is best
achieved by an independent central bank.
In the GCC, there seems to be a shared
preference for price stability, as reflected in the
low inflation rates over the past two decades.
The main question on which policymakers in the
GCC will have to reach a consensus is likely to
be the exchange rate regime of a single currency.
Up till now, all GCC member states have chosen
to peg their currencies to an external anchor and,
in so doing, have achieved a remarkable degree
of macroeconomic stability. However, there
40 See Blackburn and Christensen (1989) on the role of policy
consensus in the credibility of monetary policy.47
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might be considerations in the context of the
introduction of a single currency to modify the
external anchor or to move to a more flexible
exchange rate regime, thus allowing more
autonomy for a domestically oriented monetary
policy. Whichever path is chosen, many of the
other institutional and policy decisions to be
taken ahead of the launch of the GCC single
currency may depend to some extent on the
choice of exchange rate regime for the future
single currency. Therefore, reaching a broad
consensus in the GCC on this fundamental
orientation of monetary and exchange rate
policy before the monetary union is established
would help to avoid possible conflicts later on.41
Another matter of importance is the need to
reach a consensus among member states on
some basic aspects of fiscal policy, given that
undisciplined fiscal policies may clash with a
stability-oriented monetary policy. This is true
for the interaction of fiscal and monetary
policy in general. Moreover, under the specific
circumstances of a fiscally decentralised
monetary union, national fiscal policies may
cause significant spillover effects in other
members of the monetary union and in the
union as a whole.42 National fiscal policies
have, for example, an impact on common
economic variables such as interest rates, the
inflation rate and the exchange rate, and
through these variables on other members of
the union.43 The impact will tend to be the
greater the larger a member state is relative to
the other members of the union, implying that
the issue will become potentially more
important if large asymmetries exist in the
economic sizes of member states, as is the case
in the GCC. Thus, undisciplined fiscal policies
in the member states of a monetary union may
ignite severe conflicts within the union. While
sound fiscal policies are beneficial in general
for the economic performance of a country and
should thus be pursued irrespective of
membership of a monetary union, the case for
fiscal discipline underpinned by commonly
agreed rules becomes even stronger in the
context of such a union. It also has to be taken
into account that in a monetary union there may
be greater incentives to run excessive deficits
in member states, as the negative effects of
such deficits can be externalised.44
5.3 KEY POLICY CHOICES REGARDING
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA: PURPOSE,
ECONOMIC CONTENT AND DESIGN
An effective monitoring and assessment of
economic convergence requires a set of
convergence criteria to be defined which the
countries participating in the process of
monetary integration must in turn meet, and
which can be considered appropriate in the
specific economic context of the region.45
When defining convergence criteria, decision-
makers in the GCC face a number of
fundamental policy choices with regard to
three basic aspects (see Table 8): (i) the
purpose of convergence criteria must be
clarified (i.e. what role they are to play in the
monetary integration process); (ii) their
economic content must be decided (i.e. the
underlying set of economic variables and thus
the policy areas that are to be covered); and
(iii) choices have to be made concerning the
specific design of the criteria. The three aspects
are intrinsically linked: the purpose and
41 The issue of the appropriate monetary and exchange rate
policy in the GCC after the launch of the single currency falls
outside the scope of this paper and hence is not addressed.
42 See ECB (2003) and Detken, Gaspar, Winkler (2004).
43 Excessive government deficits will tend to increase union-
wide interest rates if the single monetary policy is not
accommodating, thereby potentially reducing growth in the
union (and possibly leading to pressure on the central bank to
loosen monetary policy). If the single monetary policy
accommodates an excessive deficit in one or more member
states, this will result ceteris paribus in higher inflation rates
for the union as a whole. Thus, irrespective of the reaction of
the single monetary policy to an excessive deficit in a member
state, the latter tends to lead to a welfare loss for the other
members. If a member state defaults as a result of
accumulated excessive deficits, this may put pressure on other
governments to bail out the country in question in view of the
threat of contagion and systemic risk.
44 The economic literature is inconclusive on this point,
however. There is a different strand of thought that implies the
opposite, i.e. that monetary union may foster fiscal discipline
in member states because, for example, the option of
monetising public debt is more difficult to realise. For an
overview of the arguments regarding the incentives for fiscal
policy in a monetary union, see Sturm (1997).
45 See Bini-Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1993) for an
overview of the discussion on convergence criteria in the run-
up to the Maastricht Treaty.48
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economic content of criteria, for example, to a
large extent influence the design, while the
design determines the objectives that can be
achieved with such indicators, as discussed in
the following sections.
5.3.1 PURPOSE OF CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
Convergence criteria can, in principle, serve as
– an information tool,
– an anchor for policies and expectations, and
as
– a disciplining device.
In serving these purposes, they may function as
an important instrument that can provide
credibility to the GCC monetary integration
project. The extent to which convergence criteria
may fulfil some or all three functions largely
depends on how they are designed, applied,
sanctioned and embedded in an institutional
framework. These issues are discussed in more
detail in the sections below. The role of
convergence criteria tends to be strongest if they
serve as a disciplining device for policies, and
weakest if they serve as a mere information tool
to assess policies. In the latter case it might be
more appropriate to speak of convergence
benchmarks rather than criteria. The potential
impact of the criteria on the convergence process
can be expected to correlate with the
consequences a country faces in the event of non-
compliance, as this determines the incentives to
gear policies towards fulfilling the criteria. This
implies that appropriate sanctions have to be part
of an institutional framework aimed at
disciplining policies effectively.
Furthermore, the time horizon over which
certain criteria should be met plays an important
role in determining the convergence process.
The European experience with Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) suggests that the
combination of a clearly defined set of
convergence criteria plus a binding timetable for
the introduction of a single currency can be a
strong instrument for fostering economic
convergence. The GCC already has a deadline
for the end point of the process of monetary
integration with the decision taken by the
Supreme Council in Muscat to introduce a single
currency in 2010. A decision has also been taken
to define convergence criteria by 2005 and to
strive to meet these criteria between 2005 and
2010. Thus, the decision on the basic approach to
be followed by the GCC to promote economic
convergence has been taken by combining
convergence criteria with a timetable which, in
view of the European experience, represents a
promising way to entrench and foster
convergence. The major difference to the EU is
that the GCC does not intend the criteria to be
selection criteria, which raises questions with
regard to, for example, incentives for
compliance (see sub-section 5.3.3).
5.3.2 ECONOMIC CONTENT OF CONVERGENCE
CRITERIA
With regard to the set of economic variables
underlying convergence criteria, a basic
distinction can be made between monetary,
fiscal  and  structural  convergence criteria,
whereby monetary criteria concern indicators
determined mainly by monetary policy, fiscal
criteria concern indicators strongly influenced
by fiscal policy, and structural criteria relate to
the probability and severity of asymmetric
shocks and the ability to cope with them (see
Chapter 4). Whether monetary, fiscal or
Purpose Economic content Design
Key policy choices – information tool – monetary criteria – entry criteria vs. permanent criteria
– anchor for policies and – fiscal criteria – selection criteria vs. indicative
expectations – structural criteria targets
– disciplining device – further issues (reference period,
thresholds, scope for interpretation, etc.)
Table 8 Key policy choices regarding convergence criteria49
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structural criteria are more appropriate for the
GCC in order to achieve a convergence process
depends largely on the focus and on the time
horizon to be observed.
If the focus is primarily on policy convergence,
in particular in the area of monetary and fiscal
policies, and if a short to medium-term time
horizon is to be captured, an emphasis on
monetary and fiscal criteria is warranted.
Accordingly, if convergence criteria primarily
serve the purpose of indicating whether a
sufficient degree of convergence in the area of
monetary and fiscal policy has been achieved in
order to enable a transition to a single monetary
policy and to subject fiscal policy to commonly
agreed rules, then this purpose is best served by
criteria that refer to monetary and fiscal
variables. Such criteria can also assist in the
assessment of whether a sufficient consensus
on the basic orientation of these policies exists
as a crucial prerequisite for avoiding tensions
and conflicts in a monetary union.46
If however the focus is primarily on structural
convergence over a longer time horizon, then
structural criteria may be appropriate.
Accordingly, if convergence criteria primarily
serve the purpose of answering the question of
whether a group of countries exhibit a
sufficient degree of structural similarity to
form a successful monetary union (i.e. whether
on the basis of the optimum currency area
(OCA) theory the establishment of a monetary
union is advisable), a focus on structural
criteria may be warranted.
Thus, the choice regarding the underlying
economic variables in terms of monetary, fiscal
and structural convergence largely depends on
the kind of information policymakers in the
GCC want to extract by monitoring and
assessing the criteria. Given the interaction of
monetary, fiscal and structural variables in the
economy, some criteria may capture
developments in more than one sphere. For
instance, a criterion concerning exchange rate
stability, although clearly a monetary criterion,
may also be a useful structural indicator to
assist in examining whether economies have
been hit by asymmetric shocks and whether
adjustment mechanisms other than nominal
exchange rate adjustments are in place.
At the same time, monetary and fiscal criteria
on the one hand and structural criteria on the
other tend to differ with regard to (i) the degree
to which they can be influenced by the
authorities’ policies, and (ii) the time horizon
over which major variations of the underlying
economic variables may occur. While the
development of monetary or fiscal variables
such as the inflation rate or the budget deficit
depend to a large extent on the course taken by
monetary and fiscal policymakers, structural
variables such as the sectoral structure of the
economy, trade patterns, labour market
features or growth cycles are largely beyond
the authorities’ immediate control. They are
influenced by various domestic and external
factors and by the decisions of a variety of
private and official agents. This also largely
explains the different time horizons over which
monetary and fiscal variables on the one hand
and structural variables on the other can be
influenced. While monetary and fiscal data
usually reflect a shift in the respective policies
relatively quickly, the effects of policies
designed to, for example, enhance growth or
reduce unemployment, or to foster structural
change or trade integration, typically take
longer to show.47 The key features of monetary,
fiscal and structural convergence criteria are
summarised in Table 9 below.
46 See Corden (1993) on the role of stability preferences in the
formation of monetary unions.
47 Moreover, structural variables are of less concern in the
context of a monetary union if price stability is the primary
objective of monetary policy, and if monetary policy is
considered to be neutral in the medium and long term with
regard to its real effects. While this does not imply that such
variables are irrelevant, structural features of the economy,
such as the synchronisation of business cycles, would deserve
more attention if monetary policy is assigned the task of fine-
tuning the economy and influencing real variables such as
growth and employment. The fact that the former view of
monetary policy is part of the policy consensus upon which the
Maastricht Treaty (as the monetary constitution of the euro
area) was built explains to a large extent why only monetary
and fiscal convergence criteria were incorporated into the
European Community (EC) Treaty.50
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In the context of the GCC, the political decision
to introduce a single currency has been taken.
Thus, the function of convergence criteria is
not to determine whether GCC countries
should form a monetary union, or indeed
whether they can be regarded as an OCA. This
understanding is reinforced by the GCC
member states’ intention to design the criteria
not as selection criteria, and to start monetary
union with all member states (see sub-section
5.3.3 below, second indent, on issues arising in
this context). The time frame for the
convergence process has also been determined
by setting 2010 as the date for the introduction
of a single currency, and 2005 as the point in
time when member states shall begin to strive
to fulfil the convergence criteria. In view of
this framework and the above considerations, a
focus on monetary and fiscal criteria tends to be
the most appropriate approach for the GCC’s
current deliberations on the design of
convergence criteria. Regarding structural
convergence, the difficulties in formulating
meaningful criteria in quantitative terms may
also justify some caution in designing and
using such criteria. Nevertheless, it is
advisable that structural convergence and the
underlying features of the economies are
subject to a multilateral surveillance process
(see Section 5.4).
5.3.3 ISSUES RELATING TO THE DESIGN OF
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
Basic issues concerning the design of
convergence criteria in the GCC are the time
horizon over which they are applied, i.e.
whether they are entry criteria or permanent
criteria, and whether the criteria are designed
as  selection criteria for participation in the
monetary union or as mere indicative targets.
– Entry versus permanent convergence criteria
Convergence criteria can be designed as mere
entry criteria. Thus, they have to be met at a
specific point in time or throughout a reference
period prior to the creation of a monetary union
to provide a basis for deciding whether the
monetary union should be established or which
countries should participate. After the
monetary union has been established, such
criteria naturally cease to be relevant.
In addition to being just entry criteria,
convergence criteria can also serve as an anchor
for policies after the establishment of a
monetary union, to be fulfilled by member states
on a permanent basis. As previously pointed out,
the act of establishing a monetary union ensures
a high degree of monetary convergence, but
fiscal convergence is not permanently secured in
a union if fiscal policies remain a national
prerogative, even though a high degree of fiscal
convergence may have been achieved prior to
the introduction of a single currency. Thus, the
permanent risk exists that national fiscal
Monetary criteria Fiscal criteria Structural criteria
Primary purpose assess direction of policy, assess direction of policy, assess structural features of the
policy consensus policy consensus economy, OCA compatibility
Responsiveness to high high low
policy decisions
Time horizon for short/medium term short/medium term long term
changes in underlying
variables
Quantification easy easy difficult
Relevant time prior to monetary union prior to and during prior to and during
for application monetary union monetary union
Table 9 Key features of monetary, fiscal and structural convergence criteria51
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policies may undermine a stability-oriented
single monetary policy if fiscal policies are
unrestrained by fiscal rules or a policy
coordination mechanism. Against this
background, there is a case for designing
monetary criteria as pure entry criteria for
monetary union, while at the same time using
fiscal criteria as both entry criteria and
permanent criteria. The latter may continue to
serve as a disciplining device once the monetary
union has been established. The disciplining
effect of the criteria depends to a large extent on
the sanctions which countries face in the event
of non-compliance. Potentially the strongest
sanction for failing to meet the entry criteria is
non-admittance to the union, provided the entry
criteria are designed as selection criteria. This
sanction is no longer available once a country
has joined a monetary union,48 implying that
alternative ways and possible sanctions to
ensure continued compliance with the criteria
need to be considered.
– Selection criteria versus indicative targets
Convergence criteria can be designed as
selection criteria with the aim of helping to
determine which countries are suitable to form
a monetary union. They can also serve the
purpose of determining when countries that did
not take part in the first round of membership
can subsequently join the union. Alternatively,
convergence criteria can serve as mere
indicative targets to be achieved by member
states. In this case, their function is restricted
to being a tool that provides information on the
development of certain economic indicators
deemed relevant for monetary union on a
systematic and comparable basis, with the
criteria serving as benchmarks.
Selection criteria obviously provide a stronger
incentive for compliance, as the potential
sanction in the case of non-compliance is
denial of access to the monetary union. This is a
potentially strong sanction. The non-
admittance to a “club”, the membership of
which is considered to be attractive, due to a
failure to fulfil the entry criteria may entail
high economic and reputational costs for the
authorities.49 Accordingly, the disciplining
effect of selection criteria on monetary and
fiscal policies can be regarded as high, and thus
they may also serve as an effective anchor for
expectations. This presupposes that the criteria
are credible, i.e. there is an expectation that
they will actually be implemented as selection
criteria and that their role in the decision-
making process will not be diluted for political
reasons. The European experience suggests
that the Maastricht criteria, which were
designed as selection criteria, were indeed
effective as a disciplining device and as an
anchor for policies and expectations.
Convergence criteria that have been designed
as mere indicative targets, while being a
helpful information tool, will tend to have a
more limited effect on disciplining policies,
and thus will also tend to be less effective as an
anchor for policies and expectations. Peer
pressure will be the only available instrument
to foster convergence and to press for the
fulfilment of the criteria. While peer pressure
may potentially be strong, its effectiveness in
disciplining policies is likely to fall short of
that of the potential sanction imposed on a
country that does not comply with the selection
criteria.
The GCC does not intend to design
convergence criteria as selection criteria.
Rather, there is a political consensus to
establish a monetary union in 2010 comprising
all six member states. Given this intention, the
authorities face the challenge of fostering
convergence in the absence of strong
incentives to comply with the criteria,
particularly if this might involve unpopular
decisions in the area of fiscal policy. Sufficient
peer pressure among the authorities will be
crucial to ensure that countries make a serious
effort to meet the criteria and to prevent the
48 Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of exclusion from
the union, which would be such a draconian measure that it can
be ruled out as a feasible sanction.
49 The economic costs can, for example, take the form of higher
interest rates, pressure on the exchange rate or a change in the
general market perception of a country once it has officially
failed a convergence test.52
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criteria from suffering a lack of credibility.
GCC countries may, in any case, face a
situation prior to 2010 in which it becomes
clear that not all member states will fulfil the
criteria for the introduction of a single
currency. They will then have to decide
whether to postpone the transition to monetary
union until the criteria are fulfilled by all
countries, or to introduce the single currency
according to schedule despite some countries’
non-compliance with the criteria.
– Further issues related to the design of
convergence criteria
Reference period
As pointed out above, particular attention should
be paid to the sustainability of economic
convergence with a view to the establishment of
a GCC monetary union. Such an emphasis on
sustainability can be reflected in the design of
convergence criteria, in particular of entry
criteria. The concept of sustainability requires
the reference period for assessment of the
compliance with the criteria to be not too short.
Looking, for instance, only at a single year prior
to the introduction of a single currency would
hardly be sufficient to come to any meaningful
conclusion regarding sustainability, and may
even lead to undesirable policy reactions. In the
case of fiscal criteria, the choice of a short
reference period may lead to a fiscal tightening
targeted only at the budget balance in the
reference period, for example through the use of
one-off measures to bring down budget deficits.
This, however, would not improve the fiscal
position in the medium term – indeed, it could
even worsen it.50 In the same vein, in respect of
monetary criteria, a short reference period may
encourage a sudden tightening of policies to
bring down inflation in the period concerned,
entailing a high cost in terms of output loss,
without representing a sustained stabilisation
effort. In order to avoid such counterproductive
behaviour and to provide an appropriate view of
sustainability, the development of the
underlying indicators should be observed over a
longer period, preferably throughout a business
cycle.
Thresholds
In the design of any convergence criterion,
thresholds, or reference values, have to be
chosen to decide at what point the criterion is
considered to be fulfilled, as well as to
determine when it has not been fulfilled.
Theory cannot generally help with regard to the
optimal reference value for a certain criterion.
There is, for instance, no way to reliably define
an optimal rate of inflation or to determine a
reference value above which a budget deficit
can in itself be regarded as excessive, or above
which a debt level can be regarded as
unsustainable. Thus, any choice of threshold
necessarily involves a certain degree of
arbitrariness. This unavoidable arbitrariness is,
however, not an argument against using
convergence criteria in principle. Rather, it
points to the need to find thresholds which are
reasonable and plausible under the specific
circumstances of a country/region, and which
are mutually consistent within a set of criteria.
This point can be illustrated by the 3% of GDP
reference value for budget deficits in the EU.
This threshold, which indicates whether or not a
budget deficit should be regarded as excessive,
was derived from the average public debt-to-
GDP ratio of around 60% in the then 12 EU
Member States at the time when the Maastricht
Treaty was concluded in 1991. Given certain
assumptions regarding real GDP growth and
inflation, a deficit of 3% of GDP stabilises a debt
level of 60% of GDP.51 Moreover, a deficit
50 The EMI’s 1998 Convergence Report quantified the effects of
temporary fiscal measures taken by EU countries in order to
reduce their budget deficits in the crucial reference year 1997 at
between 0.1 and 1 percentage point of GDP, with the level
varying according to the country. In view of these incentives of
a short reference period, the Treaty calls for the sustainability of
convergence to be assessed prior to the adoption of the euro.
51 A debt-to-GDP ratio of 60% is stable at a budget deficit of 3%
of GDP and a nominal growth rate of 5%. The assumption of a
nominal growth rate of 5% was derived from an estimate of 3%
trend growth for the EU in the early 1990s and an inflation
norm of 2%. The change in the debt-to-GDP ratio (Db) is
approximately a function of the budget deficit (d) the nominal
growth rate (n) and the initial debt-to-GDP ratio (b): Db = d - nb.
Therefore, given the underlying assumption for growth, a
debt-to-GDP ratio which is higher than 60% will decline to
60% over time if budget deficits do not exceed 3% of GDP,
while a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 60% will rise to 60% if
budget deficits stay at 3% of GDP. Consequently, debt-to-GDP
ratios will converge at the 60% level.53
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ceiling of 3% of GDP in EU countries leaves
enough room for the automatic stabilisers to
work in a recession without breaking the ceiling,
if the budget is balanced or in surplus over the
medium term.52 This is the basic rationale behind
the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact as a
framework for fiscal policy. Thus, the 3% of
GDP threshold can be considered to be
reasonable, although it cannot be argued from a
theoretical point of view that a deficit of for
instance 3.2% is excessive, whereas a deficit of
2.8% is not – or, indeed, that 60% of GDP is the
optimal level of public debt. Nevertheless, a
threshold has to be chosen and, for it to have a
disciplining effect, mechanisms to enforce
compliance must be in place.53 The inevitable
degree of arbitrariness involved in any threshold
for convergence criteria can therefore not be
used in itself as an argument against such criteria
or mechanisms to enforce them, as long as they
seem reasonably plausible.
Scope for interpretation and political discretion
When designing convergence criteria in the
GCC, it has to be decided to what extent they
should be open to interpretation, leaving
policymakers some discretion in deciding
whether or not the criteria have been fulfilled
or not. A certain degree of discretion may be
warranted to avoid too mechanistic an
application of the convergence criteria, which
may not allow for due consideration of the
overall picture, in particular in view of the
arbitrariness necessarily involved in the choice
of thresholds, or developments that extend
beyond the reference period. However, it has to
be acknowledged that there is a trade-off
between such discretion for policymakers in
the application of the criteria and their
credibility. The more room is left for a political
interpretation of the convergence criteria, the
less effective they are as an anchor for policies
and expectations and as a disciplining device.
Availability, reliability and comparability of
statistical data
An absolutely crucial issue for GCC
convergence criteria is the quality of the
statistical data on which the monitoring and
assessment of the criteria are based. First, data
for all indicators used must be available in a
timely manner. Second, the data have to be
sufficiently reliable (i.e. the need for major
revisions later on should be avoided), although
there may be a trade-off between the timely
delivery and the reliability of data. Third, data
must be comparable between member states, as
otherwise no meaningful conclusions can be
drawn from the criteria, and comparisons may
even be misleading. The European experience
shows that even in countries with a generally
sound data basis, a major effort is needed
to meet the statistical requirements for
monetary union, in particular regarding data
comparability.54 The current state of data
availability, reliability and comparability in
the GCC suggests that further effort is needed
in GCC countries to meet the statistical
requirements for a meaningful assessment of
convergence criteria – in particular in the fiscal
area – and the operation of a monetary union.
5.4 MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE OF
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA AND
INSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS
The monitoring and assessment of convergence
criteria needs frequent and effective
multilateral surveillance, which in turn
requires suitable institutions and fora to
52 See Buti, Franco and Ongena (1997).
53 The rationale for using reference values for convergence
criteria, despite some unavoidable arbitrariness, can be
compared to the rationale behind a speed limit on roads. Few
will doubt that a speed limit is a useful and necessary tool to
control traffic and to avoid accidents. However, there is no
theoretical or empirical case to limit speed to a specific
threshold. The 50 km/h speed limit imposed in cities in most
European countries, for example, is completely arbitrary, and
it could indeed be argued that 40 km/h or 60 km/h would do
just as well. No one could plausibly argue that driving 60 km/h
is always and on any inner-city road endangering traffic,
whereas 40 km/h is always safe. However, the 50 km/h value
can be seen as broadly reasonable. By contrast, a limit of 10
km/h would obviously choke traffic, and 100 km/h would
represent no effective restriction at all, making them
unreasonable choices. It is also logical that despite the
arbitrariness of any concrete speed limit, violations have to
result in sanctions, and that exceptions must be made under
special circumstances, e.g. for ambulances/the fire brigade.
54 See EMI (1996a) on the statistical requirements for monetary
union in the EU.54
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exchange information and discuss the relevant
economic developments and policies. Prior to
monetary union and the establishment of a
supranational monetary authority, it is crucial
that the national central banks participating in
the monetary integration process closely
cooperate and develop intensive working
relationships as well as an institutionalised
framework for the exchange of information and
for policy discussions. The need for close
interaction between central banks applies not
only to Governors but also to senior
management and experts. In the European
context, the Committee of Governors of
European Community (EC) central banks,
which was established in 1964 (including its
substructures and secretariat), was decisive in
laying the groundwork for European monetary
integration. It was the core body for monetary
cooperation and policy dialogue and was
instrumental in developing a policy consensus,
and formed the nucleus of later European
monetary institutions (the European Monetary
Institute (EMI), founded in 1994, and
subsequently the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) and the Eurosystem in 1998,
with the ECB at its core).
As well as having the necessary institutions in
place for central bank cooperation, it is crucial
to establish appropriate institutions and fora
for the exchange of views and policy
discussions among finance ministers and
senior finance ministry officials. In the
European context, the EU Council of Ministers
of Economic Affairs and Finance (ECOFIN)
(and, since the introduction of the euro, the
Eurogroup) is the platform for such
interaction.55 Furthermore, given the wide
number of issues in a process of monetary
integration (and later on in a monetary union)
that are of mutual interest to central banks and
finance ministries, appropriate institutions for
a confidential exchange of views between
central banks and finance ministries are of
great importance. In the EU, the role of a
platform for an exchange of views between
high-level representatives of central banks and
finance ministries is primarily fulfilled by the
Monetary Committee and, since the
introduction of the euro, by the Economic and
Financial Committee (EFC).
The necessary structures for central bank
cooperation can be replaced by a supranational
monetary authority, at the latest when the
single currency is introduced (see Chapter 6).
The institutions for cooperation between
finance ministries and for an exchange of views
between finance ministries and central banks
have an important role to play in the run-up to
monetary union in monitoring the convergence
process, but must also remain in place, and
might even have to be strengthened, after the
introduction of a single currency.
With regard to the institutional underpinnings
of multilateral surveillance, a key issue relates
to enforcement mechanisms in case national
policies deviate from commonly agreed
convergence criteria. Peer pressure is an
important instrument for disciplining national
policies, and for ensuring that national
policymakers refrain from actions which may
be detrimental to objectives pursued at the
community level. Peer pressure can be
reinforced by public pressure (“name and
shame”). This requires the process of
multilateral surveillance to be transparent to
the public, as well as the commonly agreed
convergence criteria. This is a precondition for
the public to be able to monitor the compliance
of national policies with the supranational
community’s interests. Apart from peer
pressure, further enforcement mechanisms may
be contemplated to ensure compliance with
commonly agreed objectives, rules and
standards, such as fines. If such financial or
legal sanctions are deemed useful, it is crucial
to clarify the exact nature of a sanction, the
circumstances under which it would be
imposed, and the process leading to the
imposition of a specific sanction.
55 See ECB (2001) for an overview of the economic policy
framework of EMU.55
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In the context of the GCC, the nucleus for
appropriate institutions to be assigned the task
of multilateral surveillance and policy
coordination is already in place. The
Committee of Governors of Monetary
Agencies and Central Banks is, with its
substructures, the natural body to supervise
monetary and exchange rate policies in the run-
up to a GCC monetary union and the necessary
harmonisation of legislation on banking
supervision and financial markets, given the
responsibility of GCC monetary agencies and
central banks for banking supervision and the
oversight of financial markets in the respective
member states. The task of monitoring and
coordinating national fiscal policies and other
areas of economic policy where surveillance
and coordination is required would naturally
fall to the Committee for Financial and
Economic Cooperation, which is composed of
ministers of finance and economics.
So far there is no permanently established
institution comparable to the EU’s EFC that
would allow senior central bank and finance
ministry officials from all GCC member states
to exchange views on issues of mutual interest.
The GCC’s Technical Committee, which was
formed in 2001 to prepare for monetary union
at the technical level, is a forum which brings
together officials from central banks and
finance ministries of GCC member states, and
competent officials from the GCC Secretariat
General. Given this composition, it could
provide a forum for an exchange of views
between central banks and finance ministries
on all monetary and financial issues in the run-
up to monetary union, including surveillance of
the convergence process and policy
coordination. Furthermore, it seems sensible
that such a Committee should be transformed
into a permanent forum after the establishment
of monetary union, which would then include
representatives of a new supranational
monetary authority.
For multilateral surveillance to be effective, it
is also essential to have sufficient staff at the
supranational level to prepare the meetings of
the competent bodies and to conduct the
necessary background analytical work, such as
analysing economic developments in member
states and, in particular, monitoring budgetary
policies. Assigning the staff involved in this
work to a supranational institution at the GCC
level is crucial to guarantee that analysis and
assessments are conducted from the angle of
the Council as a whole and not impeded by
national points of view. Simply entrusting staff
working for the national authorities with these
tasks and trying to foster cooperation in
committees and working groups may not be
sufficient to ensure that the necessary
supranational perspective is given due
consideration.
5.5 APPROPRIATE FISCAL CRITERIA AS A
SPECIFIC CHALLENGE FOR THE GCC
As pointed out in Section 5.2, fiscal
convergence on the basis of sound public
finances prior to monetary union is a key
indicator of a country’s willingness and ability
to implement disciplined fiscal policies, and
thus will allow tentative conclusions regarding
the sustainability of fiscal convergence after
the introduction of a single currency in the
GCC. Defining appropriate criteria for fiscal
policy is thus crucial for assessing fiscal
convergence based on sound public finances. A
binding framework regarding fiscal policy
might not only be beneficial in the run-up to
GCC monetary union, but may prove to be even
more important once the union has been
established. This could secure permanent fiscal
convergence with the objective of preventing
potential conflicts between national fiscal
policies and a single monetary policy, as well
as any negative spillovers between member
states of the union. Designing appropriate
fiscal criteria is a specific challenge for the
GCC as (i) in contrast to the monetary sphere,
fiscal convergence among member states is less
pronounced (Chapter 4); and (ii) the oil
dependence of government budgets in
combination with the volatility of oil revenues
has to be taken into account.56
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Against this background, general reflections on
fiscal convergence criteria and fiscal rules with
a view to a supranational monetary union must
be complemented by a clear acknowledgement
of the specific challenges for fiscal policy in oil
economies such as those of the GCC, as well as
their implications with regard to potential
fiscal convergence criteria.
5.5.1 GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON FISCAL
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA/FISCAL RULES
The case for fiscal rules in general, or, more
specifically, for fiscal convergence criteria in
the context of a supranational monetary union56,
is primarily based on political economy
considerations. Governments tend to have a
tendency to finance public expenditure via debt
issuance to a greater extent than is warranted
from a purely economic point of view.57 This
leaning towards excessive public deficits is due
to the intertemporal redistribution involved in
deficit financing, which shifts part of the fiscal
burden from present to future generations. A
large body of economic literature provides
theoretical and empirical evidence for this bias
in favour of deficit financing.58 Most of this
literature concerns countries with democratic
political systems, where elections, and the
efforts of competing parties to win electoral
support through expenditure-enhancing or
revenue-reducing fiscal measures, are the
driving force behind the deficit bias. Much less
is known about the political economy with
regard to public deficits in political systems
where there are no elections, or where elections
are not the ultimate source of political power and
legitimacy. While this topic is not analysed here
in detail, there is sufficient evidence, not least
from GCC countries over the past two decades,
to suggest that persistent and high fiscal deficits
and an accumulation of public debt are by no
means phenomena confined to Western-style
democratic political systems. As persistent
deficits lead to an accumulation of public debt,
the deficit bias is intrinsically linked to the issue
of debt sustainability.59
Fiscal rules can be seen as a tool to contain the
deficit bias of governments by limiting their
discretion with regard to specific parameters of
fiscal policy. They can act as a commitment
device to prevent short-sighted political
considerations leading to excessive spending
and deficits. Thus, there is a general case for
the adoption of fiscal rules to limit the scope for
discretion with regard to fiscal policy even in
the absence of a monetary integration process.
This case is enhanced in the specific
circumstances of a supranational monetary
union as envisaged by the GCC, where fiscal
policy remains the prerogative of member
states, as undisciplined national fiscal policies
may impede a stability-oriented single
monetary policy and have negative spillover
effects on the other members of the union.
Against this background, fiscal rules constitute
an institutionalised coordination mechanism
intended to oblige countries to act responsibly
with regard to the impact of their fiscal stance
on area-wide economic variables.
A number of requirements for fiscal rules have
been formulated:60
56 The term “fiscal rule” is used synonymously here with “fiscal
convergence criteria”, as the latter, particularly if they are
permanent criteria in a monetary union, have the same effect
and fulfil similar functions as fiscal rules in a purely national
context.
57 Financing public investment, tax smoothing and smoothing
business cycles are the major normative arguments proposed
by economic theory in favour of budget deficits.
58 The seminal contribution on the deficit bias from a political
economy point of view is that of Buchanan and Wagner (1977).
Later literature has increasingly looked at specific features of
democratic systems that are particularly conducive to
excessive deficits, such as individual election systems and the
degree of political polarisation, etc. (see, for instance,
Roubini and Sachs (1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991), Corsetti and Roubini (1993) and Alesina and Perotti
(1995)). For a recent overview of the literature, see
Schuknecht (2004).
59 See Chalk and Hemming (2000) for concepts in debt
sustainability and an overview of the issues involved.
60 See Kopits and Symansky (1998), who provide a
comprehensive overview of fiscal policy rules and the major
policy issues involved. This overview, as well as the
deliberations in this section, are limited to quantitative rules –
i.e. rules constraining one or several parameters of fiscal
policy. As an alternative or complement to such quantitative
rules, procedural and institutional rules may also help to
foster fiscal discipline. Such procedural and institutional
rules are for example often implemented to enhance the
control of the treasury over the budgetary process or to
strengthen the role of the Minister of Finance within the
government.57
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– A fiscal rule should be well defined with
regard to the indicators to be constrained,
the institutional coverage and potential
escape clauses.
– A fiscal rule has to be transparent,
including accounting, forecasting and
institutional arrangements.
– A fiscal rule should be adequate with
respect to the specified proximate goal.
– If there is a set of fiscal or other
macroeconomic rules, these rules have to be
mutually consistent.
– A fiscal rule should be simple and
understood by policymakers and the wider
public.
– A fiscal rule should be sufficiently flexible
to accommodate exogenous shocks beyond
the control of the authorities.
– A fiscal rule should be enforceable and
should clarify the consequences of non-
compliance.
The extent to which these requirements are met
will determine the overall credibility of the
fiscal rule and its disciplining effects on fiscal
policy. There are however some inevitable
trade-offs between the different requirements,
most notably between simplicity and
transparency on the one hand, and flexibility on
the other. The more flexibly a rule is designed
in order to accommodate for specific situations
(i.e. the more room for interpretation and
discretion is left open to policymakers – for
instance, via wide and open escape clauses),
the less simple and transparent and, ultimately,
the less credible the rule tends to be.61 From a
political economy point of view, simplicity
and transparency stand out as the most
crucial attributes to be fulfilled by an effective
fiscal policy rule.62 However, there is also
a case for flexibility in order, for instance,
to accommodate business cycles, which is
reinforced under the particular circumstance of
a monetary union. As member states are
deprived of using monetary policy and nominal
exchange rate adjustments as a policy tool to
accommodate asymmetric shocks, fiscal policy
is one of the few tools left in their hands to
counter such shocks. A temporary increase in
the deficit may therefore be warranted to limit
the fallout from a negative demand shock
hitting a member state.
Furthermore, it has to be decided in a monetary
union how far a single rule should be applied to
all member states, or how far the rule itself or
its application should be differentiated
according to specific features of the public
finances in individual countries. A single “one
size fits all” rule, such as the same deficit-to-
GDP ratio threshold for all member states, is
clearly preferable from the point of view of
simplicity and transparency, whereas a more
differentiated approach may have economic
merit in view of different fiscal positions and
features. In the GCC context, for example, the
issue arises of whether the same rule can be
applied to countries whose oil reserves will
become exhausted over very different time
horizons. The design of a rule which is as
simple and transparent as possible and
sufficiently flexible at the same time is
certainly one of the crucial challenges facing
policymakers in the GCC in view of the
inevitable trade-off.
61 This trade-off between credibility and flexibility is not one-
dimensional, however. An extremely rigid rule leaving no
flexibility at all, such as one stipulating that a balanced budget
must be maintained under any circumstances, would clearly
also lack credibility.
62 Buchanan and Wagner (1977) postulate that: “First of all, it
[the fiscal rule] must be relatively simple and straightforward,
capable of being understood by members of the public. Highly
sophisticated rules that might be fully understood only by an
economists’ priesthood can hardly qualify on this account
alone. Secondly, an effective rule must be capable of offering
clear criteria of adherence and for violation. Both the
politicians and the public must be able readily to discern when
the rule is being broken.” Kopits and Symansky also identify
transparency as the most outstanding requirement of a useful
fiscal rule. Schuknecht (2004) makes the point that clarity and
simplicity of fiscal rules are particularly important in a
supranational context, in which formal enforcement is limited
and the ability of the public and financial markets to monitor
compliance with the rules is even more important than in a
national context.58
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Apart from fiscal rules addressing deficits,
debt or expenditure, placing an explicit
obligation on national governments not to bail
each other out in the event of financial distress
in a member state may contribute to fiscal
discipline in a monetary union. Such a “no-
bailout” clause would have to stipulate that
participating countries (and the supranational
union) will not be held responsible for the
public debt of any government should funding
difficulties manifest themselves.63 If a bailout
among members of the monetary union is
explicitly ruled out, this will tend to enhance
fiscal discipline and avoid moral hazard
problems. It has sometimes been argued that a
credible no-bailout clause in combination with
an independent central bank might be a
sufficient institutional provision to ensure
fiscal discipline in a monetary union through
market mechanisms.64 According to this view,
unsound fiscal policies would result in higher
national risk premia which, in the absence of
exchange rate risk in a monetary union and in
the presence of a credible no-bail out clause,
would reflect the credit risk. Such risk premia
would discourage deviation from fiscal
discipline by individual governments and
provide them with incentives to conduct
sustainable policies. While such market
discipline may definitely be helpful, it seems
imprudent to rely entirely on this mechanism to
ensure fiscal discipline. First, it is uncertain
whether financial markets are always in a
position to fully assess the country-specific
credit risk, and thus whether risk premia are
appropriate. Second, a no-bailout clause may
not be fully credible in the eyes of the market,
depending on the perceived political cohesion
of a monetary union, and thus risk premia
differentiation may remain limited. Third, even
if the risk premia are appropriate and the no-
bailout clause is credible, it is far from certain
that governments will react to increasing risk
premia by reducing deficits, in particular if
they have a short time horizon and face
significant political pressure, such as an
upcoming election. Thus a no-bailout clause is
an additional tool to foster fiscal discipline, but
should not be relied upon entirely. Such a
provision may be useful as a complement to
fiscal rules directly addressing deficits, debt or
expenditure, but cannot substitute them.
5.5.2 FISCAL POLICY CHALLENGES IN OIL
ECONOMIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GCC
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA
Fiscal policy in oil-producing countries faces
specific challenges related to the fact that oil
revenues are exhaustible, volatile, uncertain
and largely originate from abroad.65 The
challenges will tend to be greater the larger the
share of oil revenues is in the government’s
overall revenues and the larger the oil sector is
in the economy. Given the dominance of oil in
the GCC’s economies and public revenues, it is
obvious that the specific features of oil
revenues must be taken into account in the
design of any fiscal rule/convergence criteria
for these countries. The specific features of oil
revenues pose challenges in both the long and
the short term.
In the long term the challenge stems from
the exhaustibility of oil reserves and concerns
the complex issues of sustainability and
intergenerational resource allocation. To avoid
a sharp adjustment of fiscal policy once oil
reserves are exhausted, and to secure national
wealth for future generations, oil-producing
countries have to accumulate financial assets
during the periods in which they produce oil.
After the end of oil production, the revenues
from these assets can be used to replace oil
income and to maintain levels of expenditure.
Oil wealth is thus gradually transformed into
financial wealth, leaving the country’s overall
63 The EC Treaty contains such a no-bailout clause in Article
103, which stipulates that “The Community shall not be liable
for or assume the commitments of central governments,
regional or local or other public authorities, other bodies
governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member
State […]. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the
commitments of central governments, regional or local or
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law,
or public undertakings of another Member State […].”
64 See for example Bishop, Damrau and Miller (1989) in the
context of the establishment of EMU.
65 See Barnett and Ossowski (2002). The following
considerations are mainly based on their comprehensive
overview and analysis of operational aspects of fiscal policy
in oil-producing countries.59
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wealth unchanged and preserving it for future
generations. Intuitively, this reasoning is
straightforward and makes a strong case for
persistent overall fiscal surpluses to
accumulate assets.66 However, the challenge of
deriving concrete policy conclusions from this
way of reasoning and making them operational
must not be underestimated. For example,
estimating the oil wealth of a country, defined
as the present discounted value of future
oil revenues, is surrounded by significant
uncertainty regarding the underlying
assumptions, which supports a generally
conservative approach to fiscal policy.67
Uncertainty also prevails regarding the role of
the government’s capital expenditure in
preserving overall wealth. In principle, it could
be argued that capital expenditure and the
accumulation of physical assets could at least
partially represent an alternative to the
accumulation of financial assets, thereby
reducing the need for persistent fiscal
surpluses. However, the uncertainties
surrounding the effects of capital expenditure
on productivity, future output and government
revenues, and the well-known difficulties in
distinguishing between capital expenditure and
current expenditure, are too great to draw any
clear-cut conclusions.68
The short-term challenge for fiscal policy in
oil-producing countries stems from the
volatility and unpredictability of oil prices.
Public finances are dependent on a volatile
variable that is largely beyond the authorities’
control. This poses a challenge to both
macroeconomic management and fiscal
planning. The volatility of oil prices, and hence
government revenues, tends to contribute to a
pro-cyclical pattern of government expenditure
and abrupt changes in government spending,
which may translate into macroeconomic
volatility and reduced growth prospects.
Thus, there is a case for smoothing public
expenditure in oil-producing countries, which
is further reinforced by the other potential
fiscal costs of volatile expenditure policies.69
In general, the planning of a fiscal stance by
targeting a particular level of the overall
budget balance is rendered difficult by oil price
volatility.
Several countries which derive substantial
export and fiscal revenue from oil (or other non-
renewable resources) have set up stabilisation
and savings funds to deal with both the long-term
and short-term challenges for fiscal policy. The
savings function of such funds is meant to
address the long-term issue of intergenerational
equity and fiscal sustainability by accumulating
assets, while the stabilisation function addresses
the short-term issues of fiscal planning and
macroeconomic stability by absorbing and
injecting revenue from/into the budget.70 More
66 See Alier and Kaufman (1999) who, based on an extension of
the non-stochastic overlapping generation model, make the
case for persistent fiscal surpluses in an economy with non-
renewable resources on intergenerational equity grounds.
67 There is uncertainty about the future path of oil prices, about
oil reserves, and about the costs of extracting them. In the long
run, an extreme case to be considered could be technical
innovations largely replacing oil as a primary energy source,
or significantly enhancing efficiency in the use of oil, which
would greatly reduce the value of oil reserves or even make
them obsolete. Given such uncertainties, prudence in the
design of fiscal policies is important, in particular from the
point of view of long-term considerations. See, for instance,
Bjerkholt (2003), who suggests a very conservative approach
(a “bird-in-the-hand rule”) to counter the uncertainty of a
country’s oil wealth by limiting non-oil deficits to the return
on accumulated assets.
68 Instead of classifying capital expenditure as productive
spending, whose effect on future revenues is indeed highly
uncertain and may therefore not theoretically underpin its
deficit financing, capital expenditure may also be regarded as
more akin to spending on durable consumption. According to
this view, governments undertake capital spending not
because capital is productive, but because government capital
provides social benefits for many years. Barnett and Ossowski
(2002) suggest that this view of capital spending may provide
a rationale for higher non-oil deficits.
69 During a period of rapidly rising expenditure, for example,
these costs involve a reduction in the quality and efficiency of
spending due to constraints in the administrative capacity or
the realisation of projects with little marginal value added and
difficulties in containing and streamlining expenditure
following an expansion. In periods of rapidly declining
expenditure, moreover, viable investment projects may be
interrupted.
70 See Fasano (2000) and Davis, Ossowski, Daniel and Barnett
(2001) for a review of experiences with oil stabilisation and
savings funds. The latter stress that such funds, while posing a
number of problems in themselves, are not a substitute for
explicit fiscal policy decisions and a fiscal rule both to
smooth expenditure and to ensure long-term fiscal
sustainability. Therefore, this section focuses on fiscal rules,
rather than discussing whether, in addition to a rule, the
establishment of stabilisation and savings funds would be
warranted.60
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recently, it has been suggested that the
unpredictability of oil prices and revenues
should be dealt with by using market instruments
to hedge oil market risks.71
In a monetary union among oil-producing
countries, as is the case with the GCC, both the
short-term and long-term challenges for fiscal
policy need to be addressed through fiscal
rules. The specific arguments for fiscal rules in
a supranational monetary union as identified
above – avoiding negative spillovers and the
potential impediment of a single monetary
policy –  are relevant even in the short term, and
not only over a longer time horizon. At the
same time, it is obvious that any rule
addressing short-term issues must be
compatible with long-term sustainability. A
fiscal rule which may be sufficient to contain
pressures from deficits in the short term, but
would nevertheless lead to deteriorating public
finances in the long term, would not be
plausible from the point of view of
sustainability.
The specific challenges for fiscal policy in oil-
dominated economies have implications for the
choice of the appropriate fiscal indicators that
have to be taken into account in the design of
convergence criteria. For instance, in the GCC
context the overall nominal deficit, and
accordingly also the deficit-to-GDP ratio, has
to be interpreted with even greater caution than
in industrialised economies, and cannot be
considered a reliable indicator of the course of
fiscal policy.72 In a period of rising oil prices,
for example, the deficit-to-GDP ratio may
decline in spite of expansionary fiscal policies
featuring expenditure increases or a reduction
in non-oil revenue. Higher oil revenues (and
thus higher oil GDP) would mask the fiscal
expansion. Conversely, in a period of falling
oil prices, the deficit-to-GDP ratio may rise in
spite of budgetary consolidation in the form of
expenditure reductions and an increase in non-
oil revenue. An assessment of the underlying
fiscal policy stance on the basis of the overall
deficit could therefore be misleading. As the
debt-to-GDP ratio is strongly influenced by the
overall deficit as well as by the impact of oil
prices on GDP, this indicator is also affected by
oil price developments, which may obscure the
effects of the underlying course of fiscal policy
on the debt level. Thus, the two fiscal
indicators laid down in the Maastricht Treaty,
while providing important information, cannot
be deemed sufficient to monitor and assess
fiscal developments in the GCC member states.
Accordingly, basing quantitative targets/
reference values on an unqualified deficit-to-
GDP ratio would be highly problematic, and
could even exacerbate and institutionally
enshrine a major problem of public finances in
oil economies, namely pro-cyclical behaviour.
Oil price-related deficit-to-GDP ratio
Relating the overall balance-to-GDP ratio to
specific oil price levels might point a way out
of this dilemma. Such a link could be
established by identifying a reference range for
the overall balance-to-GDP ratio to be
achieved if the oil price is within a specified
reference range or close to a specified reference
price. In view of the long-term considerations
of fiscal sustainability in oil-producing
economies as outlined above, the target overall
balance-to-GDP ratio under “normal” oil price
conditions should be positive to allow for the
required accumulation of assets. Accordingly,
a common reference oil price or a reference oil
price range would also need to be defined. This
could for instance be a long-term equilibrium
oil price derived from past developments. If the
oil price is below the specified reference range,
budget balance-to-GDP ratios below the
targeted reference range could be tolerated.
Conversely, if the oil price is above the
specified reference range, budget balance-to-
GDP ratios above the reference range would be
expected.
71 See Daniel (2001), who acknowledges, however, that the
institutional framework for such markets is not yet fully
developed and that it does not represent a solution for large oil
producers.
72 In GCC countries, developed tax systems and unemployment
insurance schemes do not exist so far. Therefore automatic
stabilisers do not at present play a role in GCC economies, and
accordingly do not deserve specific attention, unless their
impact on the overall balance increases in the process of
economic diversification.61
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An oil price-related overall budget balance-to-
GDP ratio would be a relatively simple and
transparent indicator and would at the same
time eliminate the main weakness in oil
economies of an unqualified overall balance-
to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, several caveats
have to be taken into account:
– It is difficult to identify an appropriate
reference range for the overall balance-to-
GDP ratio that is consistent with an oil price
reference range. In the same vein, defining
and agreeing an appropriate common
reference oil price or even a reference range
for oil prices is not a simple task given the
significant uncertainties surrounding oil
price developments. Thus, the framework
may have to be reviewed frequently, in
particular when developments in oil
markets change rapidly.
– Oil revenues not only depend on oil prices,
but also on production levels. Therefore,
the overall balance-to-GDP ratio is not only
influenced by oil price fluctuations, but
also by variations in oil production in a
country. This could be taken into account
when assessing the development of the
overall balance-to-GDP ratio, but would at
the same time make interpretation more
complex and thus reduce the indicator’s
appeal.
– If automatic stabilisers were to develop in
the process of economic diversification,
their impact on the overall balance would
have to be taken into account.
The primary non-oil balance/non-oil
GDP ratio
Alternatively, an indicator which insulates the
budget balance from oil price developments is
the non-oil deficit/surplus. This is defined as
government revenue excluding oil revenue
minus government expenditure, from which
oil-related expenditure is deducted (assuming
such expenditure exists, is significant and can
be clearly delineated). The non-oil deficit is not
affected by changes in oil revenues resulting
from movements in oil prices (or in oil
production), but is influenced by variations in
expenditure or in non-oil revenues. Therefore,
it could be an indicator of the underlying course
of fiscal policy in oil-producing countries.
Information may for instance be extracted from
year-on-year percentage changes in the non-oil
deficit. The non-oil deficit-to-GDP ratio is also
an important source of information, but with
one crucial caveat. Total GDP movements in
oil-producing countries are usually heavily
influenced by oil price developments (and
variations in oil production). The non-oil
deficit-to-GDP ratio may therefore decline,
signalling a consolidation effort, even though
expenditure has been increased or non-oil
revenue lowered. Such a decline in the non-oil
deficit-to-GDP ratio may be triggered by a
significant increase in total GDP due to an
increase in oil GDP following an oil price hike.
This could mask the relaxation of fiscal policy,
and thus may send a misleading signal. It may
therefore be preferable to look at the non-oil
deficit/non-oil GDP ratio to obtain information
on the course of fiscal policy, and to compare
fiscal developments in different countries.
Furthermore, if a stock of debt or financial
assets exist and generate interest payments or
revenues, the primary non-oil balance/non-oil
GDP is a more refined indicator of fiscal policy
to determine whether or not a fiscal
consolidation or expansion has taken place.
The primary non-oil balance is then more
appropriate, as declining interest payments or
rising asset revenues could for example mask a
fiscal relaxation.73
73 See Barnett and Ossowski (2002). They illustrate, using the
example of a hypothetical oil-producing country, how the
overall balance and the non-oil balance and their respective
ratios vis-à-vis total GDP and non-oil GDP react in the event
of a stylised oil price variation. Barnett and Ossowski also
give reasons why the primary non-oil balance is the most
appropriate indicator of fiscal policy from the long-term
perspective of sustainability and intergenerational equity. In
principle, these issues boil down to choosing a primary non-
oil deficit that is consistent with fiscal sustainability.62
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Notwithstanding the benefits of this indicator
outlined above, some caveats also have to be
taken into account:
– It is far from easy to identify an appropriate
reference level for the (primary) non-oil
balance/non-oil GDP ratio, and at the outset
defining a realistic path to achieve that
level.
– The share of non-oil revenues in the budgets
of GCC countries is small. A sub-balance
excluding oil revenues (and oil GDP) may
be seen as a highly “artificial” indicator,
given the importance of oil in GCC
economies. Furthermore, the non-oil
deficit/non-oil GDP ratio is inevitably high,
and the disclosure of such a high deficit
ratio may have unwarranted effects from a
psychological and confidence point of
view. In this context, it would be necessary
to explain that this is primarily a technical,
auxiliary measure to capture the
discretionary fiscal impulse.
– It might be technically difficult to
differentiate non-oil revenues from oil
revenues, and oil GDP from non-oil GDP in
a meaningful way. However, it should be
kept in mind that in industrialised
countries, cyclically adjusted deficits serve
a similar purpose as the non-oil balance in
oil-dominated economies. They are aimed
at insulating the overall deficit measure
from purely cyclical influences and
indicating the underlying fiscal policy
stance. Calculating cyclically adjusted
deficits is complex and entails a high degree
of methodological uncertainty, but
nevertheless does serve the useful purpose
of assisting in the interpretation of overall
deficit developments. In a similar vein, it
may be useful to make an effort to overcome
possible difficulties in deriving a
meaningful non-oil balance.
Combining several indicators
A fiscal framework in the GCC could also be
based on more than one indicator, in particular
given the intricacy of fiscal policy in oil
economies. For instance, developments in an
oil-price-related overall balance-to-GDP ratio
as outlined above could be combined with and
cross-checked by the primary non-oil balance.
Thus, the framework would not rely on just one
indicator, thereby reducing the uncertainties
which may appear, for instance, with regard to
the calculation of the primary non-oil balance/
non-oil GDP ratio or in interpreting oil-price-
related developments in the overall balance. A
further element could be a close monitoring of
and target for debt (asset)-to-GDP ratios.
Identifying a target for this indicator and a path
to achieve the target could be beneficial, given
the importance of debt (asset)-to-GDP ratios
for the long-term sustainability of fiscal policy
in GCC countries.
The advantage of the explicit use of a
combination of indicators is that fiscal
developments can be cross-checked before any
conclusions are drawn regarding the stance of
fiscal policy. However, this advantage comes
at the expense of simplicity and transparency,
pointing to the inevitable trade-off mentioned
above. Furthermore, the consistency of
quantitative targets and reference values, if set
for more than one indicator, must be ensured.63
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6 ISSUES RELATING TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPRANATIONAL
GCC MONETARY INSTITUTION
There are several key institutional issues that
have to be addressed prior to the introduction of
a single currency in the GCC. The first section
of this chapter briefly explains that monetary
union requires a single monetary and exchange
rate policy, which has to be underpinned by a
supranational monetary institution at the GCC
level. The following section discusses
potential degrees of centralisation/
decentralisation in such an institution with
regard to crucial aspects of monetary
policymaking. The final section reviews a
number of further key issues which have to be
taken into account in the design of a GCC
monetary institution.
The main finding of this chapter is that a single
GCC currency inevitably requires the
establishment of a supranational monetary
institution, in which decision-making on a
single monetary and exchange rate policy is
centralised. As far as other crucial aspects of
monetary policymaking – analysis,
implementation and communication – are
concerned, a division of labour between the
supranational institution and the national
monetary agencies and central banks is
possible, while taking into account certain
requirements regarding centralisation in these
areas as well.
6.1 THE NEED FOR A SINGLE MONETARY AND
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND
CENTRALISED DECISION-MAKING IN A
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTION
A GCC monetary union with a single currency
requires a single monetary policy and a single
exchange rate policy. A mere coordination of
national monetary policies by national central
banks is not sufficient to sustain a monetary
union with a single currency, given the
indivisibility of monetary policy and the fact
that a monetary union is more than just a tight
exchange rate arrangement. A single monetary
policy must be guided by economic, monetary
and financial conditions in the monetary union
as a whole. This implies that decisions on
monetary policy will be based on objectives for
the monetary union as a whole and on data for
the single currency area, such as the average
inflation rate, and that they will be reflected in
a single set of interest rates that influence a
single money market. A single monetary policy
cannot address national or regional
developments. If economic developments in
one member state diverge from the union
average, such divergent developments have to
be addressed by policies that remain in the
competence of national governments, such as
fiscal policy or structural policies.
The requirement of a single monetary policy
has far-reaching consequences for the
institutional framework in which monetary
policy is formulated and implemented.
Conceptually it is important to distinguish
between four crucial dimensions of monetary
policymaking: the analysis  of economic,
monetary and financial developments as a basis
for monetary policy decisions, the decision-
making itself, the implementation of monetary
policy decisions, and their communication to
the public. Monetary policy decisions have to
be centralised at the supranational level, which
requires the establishment of a supranational
decision-making framework. Supranationality
implies that in such a decision-making body,
members act in their personal capacity rather
than as representatives of their respective
member states. By contrast, the analysis,
implementation and communication of
monetary policy leave some room for
decentralisation, and the appropriate degree of
centralisation/decentralisation has to be
identified in view of regional circumstances.
Accordingly, the key issues arising for the
GCC regarding the institutional design of the
monetary policy framework are (i) the
appropriate format for taking supranational
monetary policy decisions in a centralised
framework, plus the shape of the supranational
monetary institution; and (ii) its relationship
with national monetary authorities, including64
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the degree of centralisation/decentralisation in
monetary policy analysis, implementation and
communication.
While there are different options with regard to
the composition of the decision-making body
concerning the level at which its members are
appointed – i.e. the supranational or national
level – a single GCC monetary policy will
inevitably require centralised decision-making
in a supranational body. An effective
institutional framework for monetary policy
must permit swift decision-taking if
circumstances so require. Such decisions may
have to be taken by majority vote if unanimity
cannot be reached. The search for a broad
consensus has its merits in decision-making on
monetary policy, and thus the decision-making
process may, in essence, be consensus-driven.
However, it is crucial that formal procedures
are in place in order to reach timely and
efficient decisions in situations which would
otherwise result in deadlock. It would therefore
not be appropriate for monetary policy
decisions to require unanimity. This implies a
willingness to accept majority decisions that
goes considerably beyond the typical
intergovernmental approach to integration.
Therefore, a GCC monetary union and the
establishment of a supranational monetary
institution will require a significant transfer of
national sovereignty to the supranational level
in the area of central banking, notwithstanding
the variety of approaches that can be followed
concerning the division of labour between a
supranational monetary institution and national
central banks in other areas, such as the analysis,
implementation and communication of
monetary and exchange rate policy (see next
section). This implies that full monetary
integration – with the ultimate goal of
introducing and managing a single currency –
cannot be achieved and sustained effectively by
a purely intergovernmental approach to
integration, in which national monetary
authorities still have the ultimate say on the
formulation of policies.
6.2 CENTRALISATION AND
DECENTRALISATION OF THE ANALYSIS,
IMPLEMENTATION AND COMMUNICATION
OF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE
POLICY
The degree of centralisation or decentralisation
in the design of a future GCC monetary
institution is discussed here in relation to those
crucial dimensions of monetary policymaking
to which differing degrees of centralisation/
decentralisation can be applied: analysis,
implementation and communication.
6.2.1 ANALYSIS
Monetary policy decisions have to be based on
thorough economic, monetary and financial
analysis. The degree of centralisation/
decentralisation corresponds to the role of the
supranational monetary institution in providing
analysis for the members of the decision-making
body to prepare the ground for monetary policy
decisions. A policy geared to the requirements
of the monetary union as a whole can only be
devised if decision-makers are provided with
thorough analysis focusing on the single
currency area as a whole. This cannot be
achieved without a coherent source of analysis.
A coherent view of the single currency area
requires a “bird’s eye view” and is more than
purely a compilation and addition of analyses of
national developments. Such a bird’s eye view
free from national bias requires a supranational
monetary institution that is entrusted with the
analysis of union-wide developments and
endowed with the necessary resources. At the
same time, a complementary, decentralised
provision of some analysis may entail benefits,
including, for instance, competition between
several centres of competence, a variety of
different analytical perspectives and a better
understanding at the national level of local
developments and circumstances, which is
particularly valuable in a supranational
monetary union in which there is significant
heterogeneity between member states.65
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Monetary policy decisions can be implemented
either by the supranational monetary
institution alone or by the national central
banks, or there can be a division of labour
between them regarding different aspects of
policy implementation. The greater the role of
the national central banks in policy
implementation, the higher the degree of
decentralisation. The scope for decentralised
implementation is however limited by the
inevitable requirement of having a single
money market with identical liquidity
conditions throughout the monetary area. This
implies that monetary operations are executed
on uniform terms and conditions in all member
states of the monetary union. This uniformity
of monetary operations and thereby the
singleness of the money market must be
ensured by clear instructions on monetary
operations from the supranational level.
6.2.3 COMMUNICATION
As with policy implementation, the task of
communicating monetary policy to public
authorities, financial markets and the general
public can be assigned to the supranational
monetary authority alone, or shared between
the supranational and national levels, or left to
the latter. In any case, it is crucial to ensure that
a coherent and consistent policy message is
sent throughout the single currency area,
avoiding conflicting signals from different
national central banks and their
representatives. The need to ensure the
consistency of policy messages has to be
balanced by comparative advantages at the
national level with regard to communication.
Notably, national central banks tend to be
closer to their respective publics and therefore
could contribute to an effective
communication.
In a GCC-wide monetary framework, the
appropriate degree of centralisation/
decentralisation would also depend to some
extent on the type of monetary and exchange
rate policy the GCC intends to pursue once the
single currency has been introduced. A fixed
exchange rate peg as an external anchor for
monetary policy, for instance, is less
demanding, in particular with regard to the
analysis and communication of monetary
policy, than an autonomous monetary policy
with an internal anchor. Accordingly, if it is
intended to peg the new GCC single currency to
the US dollar (or any other currency), and thus
to continue the exchange rate regime in place
prior to monetary union, a more decentralised
institutional framework would be conceivable.
Nevertheless, even in such a case, the minimum
institutional requirements for a functioning
single currency would have to be met from the
beginning of monetary union by sufficiently
centralising competencies in a new
supranational institution. In particular, the
institutional centralisation of decision-making
is inevitable. The historical experience with
highly decentralised central banks, which have
typically undergone some centralisation
process in the course of their history, quite
clearly points to the potential problems of
overly decentralised frameworks in the area of
monetary policy.74
Two specific aspects of the GCC facilitate the
institutional design of a supranational
monetary institution as compared with the EU,
for example. First, the relatively small number
of monetary agencies and central banks does
not pose a problem regarding the potential size
of a decision-making body even if it were to
comprise, for instance, all six Governors of the
GCC monetary agencies and central banks plus
an approximately equal number of members
appointed in a supranational context.
Similarly, cooperation among only six
monetary agencies and central banks can be
implemented relatively easily. Second, the fact
that the GCC member states share a common
74 Past examples of such highly decentralised central banks are
the early Federal Reserve System in the US, from its
establishment in 1913 until the Banking Act of 1935, and the
Federal Republic of Germany’s Bank deutscher Länder (Bank
of German Federal States). The latter was the predecessor of
the Bundesbank, which was not established until 1957, eight
years after the foundation of the Federal Republic. See
Meltzer (2003) and Goodfriend (1999) on the history of the
early Federal Reserve System, and Buchheim (1998) on the
Bank deutscher Länder.66
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language will greatly facilitate the
communication of a single monetary policy,
making it easier for the supranational monetary
authority to directly communicate with the
respective publics.
6.3 OVERVIEW OF FURTHER KEY ISSUES TO
BE CONSIDERED IN THE DESIGN OF A GCC
MONETARY INSTITUTION
A number of additional issues have to be
addressed regarding the institutional design of
a new GCC monetary institution. The
following list is far from exhaustive, but aims
to highlight key issues.
6.3.1 MANDATE
It is crucial that a GCC supranational monetary
institution is provided with a clear,
unambiguous mandate that clarifies the
primary objective of the institution, and avoids
the institution being overburdened with
objectives which it either cannot sufficiently
accomplish with the tools at the disposal of a
central bank, or which may at times be
conflicting.75  Furthermore, the mandates of the
monetary agencies and central banks of GCC
member states need to be compatible with that
of the supranational institution to avoid
differing mandates becoming a source of
confusion and friction.
6.3.2 INDEPENDENCE
Both central bank practice and academic
research provide ample evidence that central
bank independence is essential for monetary
stability.76 Against this background, a trend
towards granting central banks independence
from political authorities can be observed
worldwide in recent decades.77 The decision on
the degree of independence granted to the
central bank is ultimately a political one to be
taken by the relevant authorities in the GCC,
against the background of their historic
experience and their political systems. A broad
consensus on the status of a GCC monetary
institution and its relations with political
authorities at the GCC level and the national
level prior to the establishment of a monetary
union would reduce the risk of conflicts later
on. Furthermore, the agreed level of
independence is to be granted to all central
banks in order to provide monetary stability,
and to avoid institutional incompatibilities
between a supranational institution and
national monetary agencies and central banks.
6.3.3 PROVISIONS ON MONETARY FINANCING
The prohibition on monetary financing prevents
public bodies from funding themselves in a
potentially inflationary, non-market-oriented
manner.78 As a central bank can only be truly
independent if it cannot be obliged to extend
credit to the government, this may be referred to
as “economic independence”. Given that
provisions with regard to monetary financing
currently differ between GCC monetary
agencies and central banks, these would have to
be harmonised.
6.3.4 LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
A number of legal issues have to be addressed
concerning the organisational structure of a
GCC monetary institution, including (i) the
tasks of the supranational institution (which
would have to be clearly defined and delineated
75 The ECB’s mandate, which singles out one overriding
objective, to maintain price stability, is an example that is
clear and unambiguous in this respect. Art. 105 of the Treaty
stipulates: “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of
price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic
policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the objectives of the Community […]”.
76 See for example Parkin (1987), Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991), and Alesina and Summers (1993).
77 The predecessor of the ECB, the EMI, established a number of
criteria against which the concept of central bank
independence can be assessed in concrete terms. These
criteria apply to functional independence, institutional
independence, personal independence and financial
independence. See EMI (1996b).
78 To prevent the ECB or national central banks extending credit
to the government, which would undermine their ability to
achieve the primary objective of price stability, Article 101 of
the Treaty stipulates: “Overdraft facilities or any type of
credit facility with the ECB or with the central banks of
Member States […] in favour of Community institutions or
bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall
the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central
banks of debt instruments.”67
ECB








from those of the national central banks); (ii) the
ownership of the supranational institution
(whether it is owned by the national central
banks or vice versa, or whether another option is
available); (iii) the determination of the
institution’s budget (whether the supranational
institution’s budget is determined by the
national central banks, or it has control over the
budgets of the national central banks); and
(iv) the legal personality of the supranational
institution. However, the answer to these
questions does to a great extent depend on
the preferred degree of centralisation/
decentralisation as outlined above, as well as the
legal traditions in the region.
6.3.5 DISTRIBUTION OF SEIGNIORAGE
A decision has to be taken on how to distribute
the seigniorage generated by the performance
of the monetary policy function. The two
principal options are (i) to assign revenue to the
supranational level (assuming a single legal
issuer of the currency), or (ii) to distribute it to
national monetary agencies and central banks
according to a key that would have to be agreed
by member states (assuming the national
monetary agencies and central banks are to
remain legal issuers of the single currency).
Any provision in this regard may have
redistributive effects between member states
and could affect their national budgets.
6.3.6 MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND
PROCEDURES
A single monetary policy requires monetary
policy operations to be executed on uniform
terms and conditions in all member states of the
monetary union. Therefore, GCC member states
have to agree on a common set of monetary
policy instruments and procedures, which
together would form the operational framework
of the GCC monetary institution. It is crucial
that these instruments are designed and agreed
upon prior to the start of monetary union, to
ensure that they can be applied smoothly from
day one of the single currency. While there has
been a general trend in GCC countries away
from direct and towards indirect, market-based
instruments, differences between monetary
policy instruments applied by the GCC
monetary agencies and central banks still exist.
A starting point for work on a common set of
monetary policy instruments could be a
thorough review of instruments used by GCC
monetary agencies and central banks today,
including an assessment of experiences made
with different instruments so far.
6.3.7 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
An agreement has to be reached about control
over and management of foreign exchange
reserves. Reserves can be transferred either
totally or partially to the supranational
institution, or left in the hands of the national
central banks. The extent to which reserves are
transferred to the GCC monetary institution or
left with the national central banks will mainly
depend on the desired degree of centralisation/
decentralisation as described above, in
particular with regard to policy implementation.
If, for instance, the supranational monetary
institution is assigned the task of executing
interventions on the foreign exchange market, it
might be preferable for it to command part of the
reserves directly. While the question of who
manages and administers foreign exchange
reserves is of a more technical nature, it is of
great importance that the GCC monetary
institution and its decision-making body have
effective control over the use of foreign
exchange reserves if they remain with the
national central banks, and that the
supranational institution is in a position to
influence large foreign exchange transactions
undertaken by other public bodies in the member
states, which might impact the single exchange
rate policy. Only by exercising effective control
over the use of reserves of all member states can
the supranational institution pursue a coherent
exchange rate policy and prevent transactions by
individual national central banks or other public
bodies contravening its exchange rate policy.
6.3.8 PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Monetary union requires the provision of safe
and reliable monetary area-wide mechanisms
for the settlement of payments and securities
transactions in the single currency. The68
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existence of such mechanisms is a crucial
precondition for a smooth execution of a single
monetary policy by ensuring that liquidity
conditions are identical throughout the
monetary union. In this context, a well-
functioning area-wide payment system
offering settlement in central bank money is
necessary in order to guarantee the singleness
of the money market. Area-wide
infrastructures for the handling of large-value
and retail payments and securities transactions
are vital not only for the overall efficiency of
the economic system, but also because they
facilitate economic and financial integration in
a more general sense. A first step towards
developing the necessary infrastructures could
be to define the requirements to be complied
with by these infrastructures and to conduct a
thorough review of the payment and securities
settlement systems currently in place for the
handling of transactions within and between
GCC member states.
6.3.9 STATISTICS
The need for high quality statistics has already
been highlighted in the context of the
discussion on convergence criteria in the run-
up to a monetary union (see Chapter 5). In
contrast to the statistical work required in the
context of the convergence process, which
focuses mainly on the availability, reliability
and comparability of national data in order to
review economic convergence, the statistical
work in view of the single monetary policy to
be conducted after the single currency has been
introduced should be geared towards the
provision of area-wide statistics. The conduct
of a single monetary policy requires the
availability of a rather wide range of statistics
covering the monetary union as a single
economy, in particular in the areas of the price
index, economic developments, money and
banking, interest rates, exchange rates, balance
of payments, and the international investment
position and financial accounts statistics. Steps
towards the harmonisation of concepts and the
preparation of appropriate aggregation and
consolidation methods have to be taken in good
time prior to the start of monetary union. Their
implementation in all prospective participating
countries has to start sufficiently far in
advance, as it generally involves a significant
lead time.
6.3.10 BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Integrated banking and financial markets are
crucial in a monetary union in order to reap the
full benefits of a single currency and to
facilitate the smooth conduct of a single
monetary policy. The European experience
suggests that the full integration of banking and
financial markets does not follow
automatically from the introduction of a single
currency, but has to be spurred on by further
action based on explicit political decisions. As
a minimum requirement for a monetary union,
GCC member states need a common set of
harmonised legislation on banking and
financial market regulation. Furthermore, they
have to find solutions to ensure effective
supervision of cross-border financial groups in
a monetary union. It has to be decided whether
the model for banking supervision in the GCC
would necessarily be the same as the
institutional model to be envisaged for
monetary policy, or whether a different
institutional set-up is preferable.
In the area of banking and financial market
supervision, three issues have to be addressed
in principle in the context of the GCC monetary
union: (i) whether supervision should be
assigned to the national level or the GCC level;
(ii) whether supervision should be the task of
central banks or specific supervisory
institutions; and (iii) whether one institution
should be assigned comprehensive supervisory
authority over banks and financial markets, or
whether there should be specialised
supervisory institutions for different financial
sectors.
If supervision basically remains a national
task, it has to be ensured that effective fora and
mechanisms of information exchange and
coordination of supervisors in all financial
sectors are established. Such arrangements69
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would be necessary to ensure adequate
convergence of supervisory practices and to
address issues which may impact on the
financial stability of the single currency area as
a whole. Turning to the role of central banks in
banking supervision, there seems to be a case
for strong involvement in the GCC context as
(i) all GCC monetary agencies and central
banks are responsible for banking supervision,
and (ii) financial intermediation in the GCC is
mainly conducted via banks, with financial
markets only playing a secondary role to date.
Given the expertise of GCC monetary agencies
and central banks in banking supervision, it
would seem natural for a GCC monetary
institution to play a significant role in the
coordination of banking and financial market
supervision at the GCC level. In addition,
strong involvement on the part of central banks
and monetary agencies would acknowledge
their specific expertise in the area of financial
stability.
6.3.11 INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION
An issue to be addressed prior to the
establishment of monetary union is the
representation of the single currency area at the
international level, in particular in
organisations and fora dealing with monetary,
financial and economic issues, such as the IMF,
the G20 (of which Saudi Arabia is a member),
and, in the specific case of the GCC countries,
the AMF. The respective roles of a GCC
monetary institution, the Committee for
Financial and Economic Cooperation (and its
Chairman) and the GCC Secretariat General in
representing the monetary union at the
international level would have to be clarified. It
has to be taken into account in this context that
the statutes of international organisations
usually foresee the membership of nation
states. The appropriate representation of a
supranational monetary union, which is
warranted by the nature of the monetary,
financial and economic issues dealt with in the
respective institutions, may therefore require
special arrangements.79
6.3.12 TIMING AND SEQUENCING OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A GCC MONETARY
INSTITUTION
A supranational GCC monetary institution will
have to be fully operational as from the day on
which the single currency is introduced.
Therefore it is crucial to take into account the
lead times required to set up the institution,
including, for instance, the analytical agenda
that has to be addressed and testing the
operational framework. The European
experience suggests that the preparation for
monetary union and the ultimate set-up of a
supranational central bank are greatly
facilitated if a predecessor institution, such as
the EMI in the case of the EU, is set up early on
in the process of monetary integration. A
predecessor institution can serve as the
institutional nucleus out of which the
supranational central bank evolves, and play a
central role in the analytical and technical
preparation for the monetary union. For
instance, a predecessor institution could take
the lead in making preparations for the issuance
of new banknotes, an area which requires
careful consideration and sufficient lead times.
It can also help to address any credibility
concerns, which could arise if the
supranational institution faced the task of
building itself up from scratch (possibly having
to overcome difficulties on the way) before
being put in charge of conducting the single
monetary and exchange rate policy.
79 An example of such an arrangement is the ECB observer at the
IMF, who, for instance, participates in meetings of the IMF
Executive Board concerning Article IV consultations with EU
Member States and candidate countries and in a number of
meetings concerned with global economic and financial
developments.70
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7 FINAL REMARKS
This paper has looked at key economic and
institutional aspects of the envisaged GCC
monetary union. Introducing a single currency
in the member states of the GCC is an objective
which is supported by the region’s common
history and language, the relative homogeneity
of its political systems and traditions and, most
importantly, the similarity of economic
structures among the member states. Despite
differences between member states, these
structures remain largely dominated by the
production of oil and gas. In their endeavour to
achieve a single currency by 2010, GCC
countries can also build on a considerable
degree of monetary convergence over recent
decades, which is reflected in a high degree of
exchange rate stability, generally low inflation
rates and co-moving interest rates. The process
of monetary integration is embedded in a
comprehensive project for economic
integration which, after the establishment of a
free trade area and a customs union in 2003,
aims at the completion of a common market by
2007. However, it has to be borne in mind that
so far the level of economic integration (as
reflected in the level of intra-GCC trade, for
example) has been relatively limited. Besides
legal and regulatory barriers to closer
integration, which should be eliminated in the
course of the integration process, the similar
factor endowment of the region represents a
structural factor that limits economic
integration.
Against this background, the macroeconomic
costs of introducing a single currency in terms
of relinquishing autonomous monetary and
exchange rate policies seem to be limited. This
view is supported by the fact that GCC member
states in recent decades have not had to resort to
this adjustment instrument to deal with the
consequences of asymmetric shocks. At the
same time, the economic benefits of a monetary
union in terms of the elimination of transaction
costs could be less significant than in the euro
area for instance, as intra-regional integration
in the GCC is relatively low, and exchange rate
risks seem to be small under the present
circumstances. Notwithstanding the latter,
however, a monetary union could result in
significant gains, for example in the area of
financial markets, where a single currency
could spur the development of more liquid and
deeper financial markets. In the same vein, a
single currency could facilitate non-oil trade
between GCC member states and thereby
further the objective of policymakers in the
region to diversify their economies. Finally,
monetary union could be the catalyst for the
design of a multilateral, stability-oriented
macroeconomic framework for GCC member
states, which maintains monetary stability and
promotes the fiscal discipline that is necessary
to underpin monetary stability and to ensure
fiscal sustainability in the long term.
The analysis in this paper has pointed to some
key issues that have to be addressed by the GCC
in order to lay the groundwork for a credible
and sustainable monetary union:
– Deepened economic integration would
increase the potential benefits and
minimise the costs of the envisaged single
currency. While the agenda that has been
set in this regard by the GCC seems to be
comprehensive and well-sequenced, the
effective and smooth implementation of the
planned stages of integration will be key to
underpinning a monetary union.
Furthermore, the integration process may
have to be accompanied by a strengthening
of supranational GCC institutions to the
extent that it requires not only the
coordination of national policies, but also
the pursuit of common policies.
– Prior to monetary union, the GCC faces the
challenge of designing an appropriate set of
convergence criteria, taking into account
the specific situation of the region and the
inevitable policy choices involved in
establishing such criteria. Monetary
criteria could be used to monitor whether
the high degree of monetary convergence
already achieved by GCC member states is71
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maintained up to the introduction of the
single currency. Fiscal criteria would be
crucial in fostering fiscal convergence
among member states on the basis of sound
public finances, where significant
differences still exist. They would have to
take into account the specifics of fiscal
policy in oil economies. Fiscal convergence
has to be ensured via a permanent
framework for fiscal policy even after the
single currency has been introduced. Such a
framework is necessary to prevent
undisciplined national fiscal policies from
undermining a stability-oriented monetary
policy and having unwarranted spillover
effects between member states. For a
meaningful monitoring and assessment of
convergence criteria, GCC member states
will have to improve further their statistical
data.
– The similarity of economic structures in the
GCC, which is based on the dominance of
oil and gas and which in the past reduced the
risk of asymmetric shocks and the need to
resort to nominal exchange rate
adjustments, may diminish in the future, as
the pace and direction of economic
diversification is likely to differ among
member states. As a result, GCC countries
might become more prone to asymmetric
shocks. To absorb such shocks in a
monetary union, alternative adjustment
mechanisms need to be in place, which is a
strong argument in favour of economic
reforms aimed at enhancing price flexibility
in product and factor markets in the GCC, in
particular in the labour market.
– As monetary union requires a single
monetary and exchange rate policy, the
GCC has to establish a supranational
monetary institution to formulate and
conduct such a policy. While different
models could be envisaged for the division
of labour between such a supranational
central bank and the national central banks
and monetary agencies, decision-making on
monetary and exchange rate policy has to be
centralised at the new institution. The
single monetary policy has to be geared to
economic, monetary and financial
conditions in the monetary union as a
whole, which requires that the
supranational central bank also command
sufficient analytical resources. Such a
central bank has to be fully operational from
day one of monetary union, requiring timely
preparation.
Overarching these issues is the need for: (i) a
broad consensus in the GCC on the basic
orientation of monetary and exchange rate
policy and other key areas of economic policy,
in particular fiscal policy; and (ii) political
commitment to the economic integration
process in general, and the monetary union
project in particular. Policy consensus is
crucial to avoid tensions once the single
currency has been introduced as well as to
underpin the credibility and sustainability of
the monetary union. The political commitment
to the process has to be strong and
unambiguous at the highest political level in
order to overcome obstacles or deadlock on the
way to monetary union. At the same time, the
political commitment has to be an informed
commitment that fully takes into account the
inevitable implications of monetary union. In
particular, monetary union ultimately results in
the transfer of sovereignty from the national to
the supranational level in monetary affairs and,
to some extent, needs to be accompanied by
constraints for government budgets, which are
areas widely regarded as being at the core of
national sovereignty.72
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